Artificial intelligence is more than just a technology; it acts as a new tool reshaping how humans perceive themselves and society. During this transformative process, how much do we truly understand AI, and what meanings do we attach to it? In this interview, where we examine not only AI’s functions but also its impact on us and seek answers to many compelling questions, Communication Scientist and Academic Ufuk Eriş responded to our inquiries.

Mustafa Burak Avcı: Welcome, Professor Ufuk Eriş. Your recent contributions to the field of communication, particularly your research on artificial intelligence, have gained recognition. Could you share a bit about yourself?

Ufuk Eriş: It wouldn’t be entirely accurate to say recent times. Because when I suggested that topic for my PhD, it was 2002. I wasn’t born into a computer-equipped home. My first encounter was in 1996 at the Computer Research and Application Center. There, I had a chat via IRC (Internet Relay Chat) with someone living in America, and I never believed that the other person was a real human. Then years passed, and I saw how technology changed people’s perspectives and thinking patterns. In 2002, I wanted to address the topic of hacker culture in Türkiye for my doctorate proposal. At that time, there were very few hackers in Türkiye, and the only well-known one was Tamer Şahin. He was featured in newspapers as the “Pajama Hacker.” It was written that he hacked the Ottoman Bank, but back then, even if hackers existed, there weren’t many places to break into. That’s why we faced a lot of difficulties with the jury.

Finding someone related to this topic was quite difficult. There was a sociologist, someone from human resources, an industrial engineer, and a communicator. It was very hard to explain my problem to them. There are people called hackers, and when I said they could break into here, they would say, “So what if they do?” Our laws weren’t even prepared for this. When you connect remotely to someone’s computer, it is considered theft. In theft cases, you take a piece of property, and that property is no longer there, but if you copy it from a database, it remains there you’re just making a copy. I have also witnessed such a significant transformation in the law.

Deniz Benzer: When you announced your doctoral topic 20 years ago, the situation you experienced is happening today with artificial intelligence. With the same sense of unfamiliarity and excitement you felt when writing your doctoral thesis, what similarities or differences do you see between that and the excitement people have towards artificial intelligence today?

U.E: Every new technology excites thinkers or those pondering this issue. The reason is always our troubles. Looking at Karl Marx, he examined the society he lived in and said something wasn’t going well. He saw that people were unhappy, researched the cause, and proposed a method to analyze societies. But what is his concern? We are not very happy in life, and the environment isn’t happy either. Nowadays, people who write and talk about every new technology wonder if it could be a cure. I think, unlike the hacker discussion era, in the age of artificial intelligence, people are only interested in its sensational aspects. No one asks which of our problems it could solve. They only care about what more artificial intelligence can do. For example, if an A.I. can do ballet, why would someone who has nothing to do with ballet culture get excited? The sensational approach is misleading. I can say for sure that in no period of history have people been so hopeless about future generations and linked their hopes to something non-human. Think about it: they said Jesus would come, and he was human… They said future generations would do this, and they were human too… We always believed that our own kind would do something good in the future. Now, that belief is gone; we talk about what artificial intelligence will do in the future, how it will be. We tend to project solutions to our life problems onto technology, which reflects a techno-chauvinist attitude.

“First, we see the word ‘robot’ in Karel Čapek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots. The word literally means slave or forced labor in Slavic languages. In the story, robots rebel and suppress humans. The question ‘Will robots take over humans?’ actually stems from the concept of rebellious slaves.”

M.B.A: There’s also an effort to alienate artificial intelligence tools. Strange philosophical questions arise, such as whether AI could be smarter than humans as individuals, or whether it would be considered human if it were on par with a person.

U.E: At a time when the possibility of humans competing with artificial intelligence is being discussed, and while such advanced technologies are being produced, a world where news is still about men who kill their divorced wives should make us think: Should our real concerns be what artificial intelligence can do? This is the culture’s surrender to technology. In the past, culture dictated and limited the use of technology. We can give the example of the samurai sword. Not everyone can wield it, and when you do, you must adhere to certain ethical codes. One of our folk songs beautifully says: ‘The invention of the rifle ruined the virtue.’ Because to use a rifle, you don’t need years of samurai discipline and culture.

When you buy a rifle, just pulling the trigger is enough. Every profession has its own cultural codes, but such things are no longer in place. You don’t need education or an ethical code to pick up a pen. When you pay, you get your computer and use it as you wish.

M.B.A: Today, you don’t even need talent; you just prompt and can have anything drawn.

U.E: It seems like we don’t really know much about what we call artificial intelligence. There are the powerful and the powerless. What we talk about is like a utopia. I always say, “Utopias turn upside down and tell the stories of the problems we face today.” Let’s say you ask the housekeeper who comes to clean your house, “If you had the means, what kind of life would you imagine, what is your utopia?” Her answer would be, “I wish I had a husband who doesn’t drink, and that he wouldn’t hit my children, for example.” At that moment, you immediately understand her everyday worries about her life. Now, if you look at the utopian narratives about artificial intelligence and read them in reverse, and see what people expect from it, you’ll realize the real problems they face today. If someone is curious about whether artificial intelligence will do this or that, they have a problem in their daily life related to it. In the past, wars would start and end, but now we experience prolonged, low-intensity conflicts that never seem to end. People still die. We are in the digital age; today, the AI robot Sofia is granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia. It won’t be given to you or me. So, the question that should be asked is, “Will artificial intelligence provide a solution to inequality among people?” When we evaluate the moral panics developed around robots, you also understand whose fear this is. First, we see the word “robot” in Karel Čapek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots. The word literally means slave or forced labor in Slavic languages. In the story, robots rebel and suppress humans. The question ‘Will robots take over humans?’ actually stems from the concept of rebellious slaves. The main issue is that those who manage these things whether under the image of a robot or not force certain people to work for much less pay, and they fear rebellion. The core motivation behind thoughts like a robot uprising or artificial intelligence turning humans into this or that is this fear.

M.B.A: There is always a current agenda regarding artificial intelligence. So, what are its cultural impacts?

U.E: Culture is no longer something naturally produced by people as it used to be. The term “degeneration”, which we refer to as cultural decay, comes from the fact that animals in Anatolia that have lost their reproductive ability are called “Yoz” (biggot). A degenerated culture loses its ability to renew and produce itself. So, what happens then? It’s like a diabetic person who can’t produce insulin and starts getting insulin

“Nowadays, all of this is considered outdated. But what is new doesn’t stay in the air; it comes from the ground. Did the bourgeoisie, the working class, and class confl icts emerge when Karl Marx spoke about them? Even during the cave era, there was a conflict between the strong and the weak.”

injections from outside. After a while, they become dependent and lose their ability to produce it themselves. Everyone used to sing folk songs, good or bad, or write poetry for the girl they loved. But now, as people start to import poetry and songs from outside, they begin to lose their ability to express themselves. The reason for this, according to the Frankfurt School, is the Culture Industry. Before the rise of the internet, this was all lost.

M.B.A: Today, habits have changed, consumption has accelerated, and production methods have evolved. What do you think about this?

U.E: Society has changed, and the social approach has changed. For example, Yusuf Atılgan’s work Aylak Adam (The Loiterer) entered a competition. At that time, there were very famous novelists like Yaşar Kemal on the jury. However, the work did not win the competition. As socialist writers, they said, ‘This bourgeoisie’s self-concern, they’re not talking about a problem or poverty.’ Today, almost everyone knows Yusuf Atılgan’s Aylak Adam. It became popular after the 1980s. Because now individuality begins to take shape, and, in a way, the individual becomes a customer. After Turgut Özal’s presidency, even our purchasing mindset changed. In the past, people would save money for a while to buy a television; they didn’t know the concept of installments. Now, people might wonder how they don’t know the concept of installments, because we quickly get used to the way we live, and it feels as if it’s been like this for a very long time.

M.B.A: Actually, with the rapid acceleration of consumption, we also lost the habit of saving cumulatively.

U.E: People now think there’s no need to accumulate things. They ask, “What’s the point of saving?” I used to download songs from the internet and listen to MP3 players. Now, my nephew tells me, “Why are you downloading these? They’re already in the cloud.” In the past, when you bought a car, it was considered a lifelong purchase, and people would give it a name. Now, it’s said that you need to change your car frequently. But this widens the gap between us and objects. People renting homes don’t even want to hammer in a nail because they don’t accept it. If you accept it, it’s hard to let go, so you end up buying something new right away. For example, you throw away every soda can you drink immediately, but you can’t easily throw away the last soda can you shared with a friend or a loved one. Someone has touched that can, and you can’t throw it away. But this situation is dangerous for the system; if you can’t throw it away, you won’t buy a new one. In short, while there are such problems in life, it’s important to see how artificial intelligence responds to them. We don’t see this in the market; people in daily life genuinely think that A.I. has a human-like intelligence.

D.B: Professor, actually, Alan Turing’s test is very important in this context. Could you tell us a little about it?

U.E: In the Turing test, a human participates, and on the other side, an artificial intelligence or robot is placed. The human asks the machine questions. If the responses make it seem like the machine is not artificial intelligence, then it passes the Turing test. But there is also John Searle’s Chinese Room example as a counterpoint. In that scenario, there is a closed room with only one window. Inside, there are some signs and instructions. You are told to look at whatever sign is shown through the window and find the corresponding instruction. Outside, a Chinese man is showing the Chinese Kanji words to the participant. The person inside the room, who does not know Chinese, finds and removes the sign that matches the question. Does the person inside the room who removes these signs know Chinese? No, they are just following instructions. Nowadays, all of this is considered outdated. But what is new doesn’t stay in the air; it comes from the ground. Did the bourgeoisie, the working class, and class conflicts emerge when Karl Marx spoke about them? Even during the cave era, there was a conflict between the strong and the weak.

D.B: After all, artificial intelligence provides us with information, and we try to measure how intelligent it is. What do you think is the level of intelligence of that artificial intelligence? Why do we consider it to be intelligence? Where does the information provided by artificial intelligence stand in the hierarchy of knowledge?

U.E: There is no zero point in IQ, which is referred to as intelligence, for example. In an IQ test, it measures how quickly a person can solve a problem or how quickly they can find the optimal timing and compatibility between purpose and means. The Frankfurt School calls this “subjective reason” or “instrumental reason.” It is a characteristic of human intellect but not the whole thing. Instrumental reason only looks at establishing a relationship between goals and means. There is also objective reason, which not only establishes the relationship between purpose and means but also questions the purpose itself.

Instrumental reason appears, for example, during Hitler’s era. When officers who inflicted various tortures on people were tried at the Nuremberg Trials, they said, “We only followed orders.” There was both means and purpose involved there. You did what was told, but isn’t the choice to do or not do it yours? Did you ever question its purpose? Currently, the most sought-after type of reason is instrumental reason, which can do what it is told very quickly and efficiently, but we do not elevate the reason that asks, “Why am I doing this?” In fact, questioning reason is what makes humans understand and interpret reality, and it helps us position ourselves accordingly.

D.B: So, should we define artificial intelligence as instrumental reason?

U.E: Of course. We constantly talk about artificial intelligence, which is a very sensational word for those who don’t know. In reality, there is a huge gap between the way artificial intelligence is described and its state in the laboratory. Every new technology can make us ask, “What is a human?” again and push us to take a step forward. Nietzsche also refers to the “Übermensch,” meaning a person who struggles with themselves. Like the phoenix, first burning and then rising anew from its ashes. Objective reason is only concerned with how fast and how many goals it can score in a game. But winning a rigged game is very difficult. The referee is biased and bribed. Since you don’t think about the game itself, you don’t notice these things, and when you fail, you blame yourself. Just as you think the problem is personal.

M.B.A: Actually, the data that artificial intelligence feeds on is a product of societal production. There is already a data algorithm that develops from what people produce. They seem to be getting their nourishment from an invisible source, as if drawn from nothingness.

U.E: Never. In fact, artificial intelligence largely feeds on garbage, on free data from the internet. This means that A.I. can think, but it can only do one task at a time. Then it can move on to another task. Because we now see life this way, we are losing the other side. Deep Blue beat Kasparov in chess, but it can’t get up and bring a glass of water. Yes, maybe it would beat you at backgammon too, but when it wins, it’s happy, and when it loses, it’s sad. We are trying to get A.I. to solve the world’s problems. To end wars, to solve inequality, to prevent crimes. But the thing is, don’t fight, don’t hit. Why don’t you take responsibility yourself? While living with the idea that we can make it do everything, we lose our human side. Recently, they asked A.I. Sophia, “What do you think about the future of the world?”

So, humans are no longer confident about their intelligence. People are becoming increasingly anxious. We fear that artificial intelligence will take away what makes us who we are. That’s why we keep asking it, “Will it do this too?” To put it simply: you have a lover, and they are unique because of a distinguishing feature. If you take that feature away, they become just like everyone else. Even if that lover remains physically present, they are no longer truly theirs. The existence of that lover is gone. That’s why one of the fundamental questions technology poses to us is: “If they take away what makes us us, will we cease to be?” On the other hand, because we’re so curious about this, we constantly try to make it do the things we do. We keep trying to understand “What is the natura humana?” and instead of thinking of it as a tool that can solve our main problems, we sit and discuss its sensationalist aspects.

D.B: Today, when we look at the internet and artificial intelligence, do you think the realm of freedom has disappeared?

U.E: I think it mostly gets lost. But it will be what we make of it. For example, the last word used for social media is “brain rot,” meaning brain decay. Fifty years ago, they called the television “the idiot box.” It’s the same old story. They say, ‘Old wine in a new bottle.’ Basically, nothing changes. We used to call social media “the Fifth Power,” the fifth force after the Fourth Estate, which is the media. It was supposed to improve the quality of so-called democracy. But I think it still has the potential if we use it properly. We need to look at why people delegate tasks they themselves are responsible for to artificial intelligence. Why do people retreat from decisionmaking mechanisms? Because it’s believed that A.I. will make better decisions. Maybe even in investments, and perhaps in political choices in the future… Why? Because it chooses the more efficient and profitable option. But for humans, truth, efficiency, and profitability don’t always align. This is true even in the founding of our country. Atatürk and his comrades wouldn’t have relied on A.I. for their efforts. It’s not feasible. The shoes are worn out, and they have holes. There’s no food, no weapons. How many places have they been attacked from? Ignorance is present. Most of the educated have died. The army is exhausted. If it were up to A.I., accepting a mandate from America would have been the most logical, efficient, and profitable choice. But we didn’t choose that. To give a personal example, the person you love so much probably wouldn’t be recommended to you by A.I. Most likely, they are the person you shouldn’t be around. Let’s identify our true problems and avoid relying solely on artificial intelligence to solve them, risking failure. Instead, the new generation should ask, ‘How can we eliminate inequality among people? How can we undo the damage affecting our environment? How can I contribute to the benefits of others beyond myself?’

M.B.A: Thank you very much for coming and providing us with valuable information, sir.

U.E: Thank you very much, everyone. It was a pleasure for me too. Kasparov against IBM’s Deep Blue computer, 1996 ai & society

Artificial Intelligence: The Alienation of Society yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

“By arguing that ‘the medium is an extension of the human body or mind,’ he described the wheel as an extension of the foot, the book as an extension of the eye, and clothing as an extension of the skin.”

For those less familiar with his scholarly work or theoretical writings, Marshall McLuhan is often recognized by that famous photograph of him standing before a wall of television screens. In the public imagination, he remains a prominent media figure and one of the founding fathers of New Media theory. With the concept of the Global Village he introduced in the 1960s, he foresaw that the internet would become an infrastructure technology; at a time when everyone was focused on content, that is the message he pointed to the tools, or more accurately, the “medium.” Through his provocative ideas, television appearances, lectures, and presence in mainstream media, he elevated his fame far beyond the typical sphere of influence for an academic. He succeeded in reaching a wide audience; with his media critiques, cultural analyses, and distinctive aphorisms woven into his compelling style, he became a well-known figure. Thus, he is recognized as one of the most influential media theorists of his time and as one of the early science communicators, successfully opening up his ideas for public debate. Discussions on how mass media influences human senses and the balance between them continue to follow the path McLuhan pioneered. The media theories and analytical framework he established remain a powerful conceptual tool for studies aiming to interpret new media.

McLuhan is particularly remembered for concepts such as The Medium Is the Message and The Global Village; for this reason, he has faced harsh criticism from academic communities. However, the fact that the internet and social media have evolved into a fundamental communication technology worldwide, as he predicted, serves as proof of how accurate his predictions were. Moreover, McLuhan’s ideas were not limited to books; he reached out to the public through his unforgettable interview with one of the most popular magazines of his time, Playboy (1969). By distilling his media theories down to their simplest terms and illustrating them with examples relevant to everyone’s daily life, he used the very medium through which he communicated his ideas as a tool in the process. Indeed, by stating that “The medium is the extension of man”, he described the wheel as an extension of the foot, the book as an extension of the eye, and clothing as an extension of the skin; he defi ned technology as a natural part of humanity’s process of enhancing its own capabilities. In this interview, he elaborated on one of his most memorable statements, “The medium is the message,” by saying, “Television is not just an entertainment box; it reshapes the way people see, hear, feel, and think,” and he engraved his theory in people’s minds using examples from everyday life. Another medium through which McLuhan continued his efforts to popularize science was television. After his books made it onto the bestseller lists, McLuhan was featured in the episode titled The Medium is the Message from NBC’s documentary series Experiment in Television. Produced with an experimental approach, this episode visualizes McLuhan’s theories through colored lights, rapid editing, and a pop-art aesthetic. The documentary describes McLuhan as the “high priest of pop culture” and a “trendy intellectual.”

“‘Television is not just an entertainment box; it reshapes the way people see, hear, feel, and think,’ and he engraved his theory in people’s minds using examples from everyday life.”

He employed the same strategy in his lectures, conveying his theories through examples that resonated with students’ lives. Rejecting traditional lecture formats, he used everyday details from advertising slogans to newspapers and from popular songs to street signs as examples. He analyzed Coca- Cola’s Things go better with Coke slogan and examined the poetic narrative of advertisements. In this way, he produced theoretical approaches using data gathered from everyday life, translating abstract analyses into understandable language. Through this, he brought academia’s closed discourse into everyday life in a way that the average person could comprehend. While explaining how even typography shapes human thought, he illustrated how every detail from the layout of newspaper pages and street posters to the arrangement of lines in store windows shapes perception. He emphasized that writing shapes the senses not only through its meaning but also through its form.

In his lectures, he effectively put on a stage performance; through humor, irony, and theatrical gestures, he aimed not only to have the audience listen but also to surprise them, make them think, and encourage them to question. From time to time, with unexpected phrases like “Today I’m not speaking to you, but to this microphone,” he conveyed the impact of the medium directly to those watching in that very moment. He described the massive live broadcast Our World in 1967, featuring twenty-four countries, as a communication miracle in which the world had transformed into a Global Village. He characterized The Beatles’ performance of All You Need Is Love as a collective rhythm in which millions of people could share the same emotion simultaneously. In this way, he defi ned a technological revolution as a process that resonates with the public’s senses. Similarly, in that unforgettable scene from Woody Allen’s Annie Hall where a character brings McLuhan into the, his intervention in the characters’ discussion with the line “you know nothing of my work” served as a way to infuse his theory into popular culture. In this way, he brought even an academic debate to the public using the language of humor and everyday life, thereby taking science communication beyond its traditional boundaries. One of his most remarkable works is the book The Medium Is the Massage. Like his other works, this book is based on his own theories, as he explains them.

Unlike standard theoretical texts, McLuhan crafted this book using collage aesthetics, typographic play, visuals, and short passages, thereby embodying the image that form is an integral part of content. He also collaborated on this book with Quentin Fiore, one of the most important graphic designers of his time, producing a visually appealing work that brought it recognition. While the word “Massage” in the book’s title, may appear to be a mistake, he explained that he chose to use “massage” instead of “message,” implying that communication tools stimulate and shape human senses like a massage. Thus, even the book’s title has become an example reflecting McLuhan’s theoretical horizon.

During the years when McLuhan was developing his theories, the prevailing perspective in communication studies was an approach that focused on the content of messages and drew on models of propaganda and attitude change. In contrast to this content-centered approach that took shape after World War II, McLuhan placed the medium at the center, opening a discussion of the transformative role of the medium’s carrier in human senses and social order, thereby distinguishing himself from his contemporaries. Structuralist and language-centered theorists generally found McLuhan’s emphasis on the determinism of media to be reductionist (oversimplifying a complicated issue by trying to explain it using only one single cause), prioritizing the analysis of symbolic orders and cultural codes. Sociological critiques, meanwhile, viewed his positioning of technology as the sole key to social change as incomplete, arguing that he overlooked the cultural context.

Despite all these ideological differences, McLuhan opened up a space for public discourse not only through his conceptual vision but also through the way he shared these concepts with society; he succeeded in popularizing his theory by establishing a broad repertoire of communication, ranging from television programs to radio interviews, and from magazine columns to theatrical performances on stage. He embraced television, the rising medium of the era, before his peers, going beyond merely describing its transformative impact to letting people experience it firsthand. This is because television, especially from the mid-1950s onward, took its place in homes and became the center of daily life.

“McLuhan’s concepts of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ media among his most important conceptual tools provide a significant framework by explaining the interaction between the user and the medium.”

Television transformed the social steering power that radio and cinema had maintained for many years by offering moving images, sounds, and live broadcast capabilities. With its diverse content ranging from news bulletins to entertainment programs, from series to sports broadcasts, it shaped the daily routines of the masses, transforming people’s agendas and even the way they perceive life. While bringing individuals together around a shared visual culture, it has reshaped the advertising industry from top to bottom, serving as a pillar for the spread of consumer culture on a mass scale. With this effect bringing family members together in front of the same screen in daily life and reorganizing the flow of life, it has also provided a powerful example to support McLuhan’s distinction between “hot” and “cool” media.

McLuhan’s concepts of “cool” and “hot” media among his most important conceptual tools provide a significant framework by explaining the interaction between the user and the medium. Examples of these include radio, cinema, and printed books. These media are defi ned as “hot” tools because they feature high resolution, dense data, and closed meanings. This is because these tools leave no room for the viewer to think, thereby creating a passive perceptual process. In contrast, “cool” tools are media that offer low resolution, incomplete data, and force the viewer to complete the meaning, thereby requiring active participation.

However, McLuhan places television in a very different category within cold media. He compares the viewer’s data flow in a “cool” participatory medium to a mosaic. To understand this method of data transmission, first understanding “what a mosaic is and why he equates television with it” is important.

In its most basic sense, a mosaic is a visual art form in which small, colorful pieces (stone, glass, ceramic, etc.) come together to form a whole. While each piece may not carry meaning on its own, when placed side by side, they create a large and meaningful composition. McLuhan uses this aesthetic structure to describe the modes of perception and thought in the media age. According to him, modern communication media -particularly television, advertisements, magazines, and later the internet- present information not in a sequential and linear manner, but in a fragmented, polyphonic, and simultaneous way. This requires the viewer to do more than just watch; it demands the ability to actively “fi ll in” the missing pieces. Social media feeds are one of the most prominent examples of this mosaic structure today. An Instagram Explore page or a TikTok feed creates a mosaic-like transmission experience where independent fragments are arranged randomly yet form a coherent whole in the user’s mind. Here, the mosaic is not merely an aesthetic element but is regarded as a new form of thinking, seeing, and constructing meaning in the media age.

McLuhan’s mosaic narrative form is directly intertwined with the concept of “cool media.” Just as a mosaic presents a fragmented and incomplete whole to be completed in the viewer’s mind, cold media also expects active participation from the viewer. Such media do not present everything “readymade” in high resolution; rather, they provoke perception, leave gaps, and make the viewer a part of the process. Mosaic structures such as newspaper layouts, advertising collages, or social media feeds do not transmit information directly; instead, they create chains of associations in the minds of their audiences. Thus mosaic aesthetics aligns closely with the fundamental characteristics of cool media. Low definition encourages high participation and, consequently, the production of multiple meanings. Television’s “two-dimensional mosaic” narrative, the constantly shifting content of social media, and postmodern designs constructed through collage techniques all establish a relationship in which the audience is not merely a consumer but also a producer of meaning. In this context, the mosaic structure can be understood as the visual and structural counterpart of McLuhan’s concept of cool media.

Within all these television programs and the institutional frameworks used to communicate with the masses, one of the most symbolic examples of McLuhan’s rise to international prominence was his feature in Time Magazine in 1969. Appearing in such a prestigious publication was an almost unimaginable sign of popularity for a communication theorist. The magazine described him with striking phrases like “the high priest of pop culture” and “the metaphysician of media,” emphasizing that he was a figure capable of speaking to the broader public’s search for meaning in a rapidly changing world of communication. He did not limit his influence to print and visual media; in connection with his work The Medium is the Massage, he recorded an audio album (LP) composed of music, sound, and fragmented narratives, thereby extending his theory into an auditory experience. McLuhan’s influence was not confi ned to North America; his ideas were widely discussed in intellectual circles across Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom and France, and are considered to have inspired the media theories of later thinkers such as Baudrillard.

Marshall McLuhan was not only one of the most influential media theorists of the 20th century but also a powerful science communicator who could convey his theories by bringing them directly into everyday life. His media theory opened a new paradigm in understanding communication by arguing that the medium is more powerful than the message; by viewing technology as a natural extension of humanity, he redefi ned the relationship between humans, the senses and technology. By appearing in popular media, he succeeded in bringing academic thought into the lives of ordinary people; through his conferences, television programs, magazine interviews, and stage performances, he transformed his theory into a spectacle, thereby making science accessible to the masses. McLuhan’s predictions have been largely validated by the rise of the internet, social media, and globalized communication networks, and the concept of the global village has become a reality in today’s world.

Despite all criticism, the analytical framework he developed regarding media remains a fundamental reference point in media studies. His legacy is an intellectual he approaches communication not merely as the transmission of information, but as a dynamic process that transforms human senses, modes of perception, and social structures.

In this regard, McLuhan is remembered as a theorist who continues to shed light on modern communication studies and whose ideas stand the test of time.

Marshall McLuhan: The Mastermind Behind the Media yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

Communication sciences researcher Mert Demir examines Yanis Varoufakis’s highly debated book Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism? He explains the structural shift from traditional market economies to a new digital paradigm. Exploring the rise of cloud capital, algorithm-driven platforms, and our modern roles as “cloud serfs,” Demir connects Varoufakis’s economic framework to Byung-Chul Han’s concept of psychopolitics.

Elif Başlantı: Welcome. Could you introduce yourself?

Mert Demir: Hello, thank you very much. I am Mert Demir, a research assistant at Istanbul Beykent University. I am also pursuing a Ph.D. in Communication Sciences at Marmara University, where I am currently writing my thesis. My main research interests lie in the sociology of communication.

E.B: In our seventh issue, we focused on Techno-Feudalism as the main theme. Can you share insights about the book Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism?, a key work that introduced this idea and established its theoretical basis?

M.D: Yanis Varoufakis highlights that as digitalization, the platform economy, artificial intelligence, automation, and especially algorithms evolve, they are reshaping existing production relations. Collectively, these elements are forming a new type of production system that exists outside the traditional capitalist framework.

E.B: A key strength of the book is its narrative, centered on a father-son dialogue, employing language that is informal and relatable. As a reader, what are your impressions of the book’s tone and storytelling style?

M.D: Varoufakis approaches this book not as an academic work but as a conversational response to an old discussion with his father. This simple, accessible style is consistent with his other writings on capitalism and related topics. He enjoys explaining complex ideas in a way that the public can understand, which we might call popular science or accessible writing. His skill in this area contributes to the book’s popularity, as it is written in a way that anyone can read and grasp. I find this valuable because if it had been written in an academic tone, its impact would likely have been less. Though others have addressed similar ideas before, this book is especially notable for its successful popularization of those concepts. Overall, it is a highly impactful book in terms of popularity.

E.B: This book isn’t primarily focused on solving problems; rather, it contributes new ideas to the literature. For instance, it introduces novel class categories like cloudalists alongside the traditional capitalist bourgeoisie, and cloud proletarians alongside ordinary proletarians. You noted that the book is somewhat detached from existing literature. Does it provide a strong conceptual framework to justify this observation?

M.D: The explanation largely matches existing literature, though his style and structure differ from our usual expectations. Before diving deeper, we should clarify Varoufakis’s perspective on this capitalist transformation. How does he describe this shift? How does he frame it? Let’s explore that. The concept of Techno-Feudalism is rooted in scholarly work, and Varoufakis highlights lesser-known aspects, making the idea more accessible. His main point is that our traditional capitalism has been replaced by a new system what he calls Techno-Feudalism because communication technologies now operate outside the traditional market mechanisms. Historically, feudal economies were land-based; with land owned by feudal lords, vassals in the middle, and peasants at the bottom. Feudalism centered on landownership, with lords owning the land and vassals paying rent or dues. Peasants worked the land within this hierarchy. This system shifted with the advent of modern capitalism, which replaced feudalism with an industrial economy. Capitalist ideology promoted the idea that capital and commodities could circulate freely, emphasizing the importance of commodities and money. This promise was that capital could move without restrictions, underpinning the focus on individual capitalists, and aligning with liberal economic principles. However, while capital was viewed as free to move, the free movement of labor was rarely acknowledged.

“Varoufakis emphasizes that, although the old ideal was perfect, the system once operated within its own limits. Today, this is no longer possible because the free market has been replaced by something entirely different.”

Varoufakis emphasizes that, although the old ideal was perfect, the system once operated within its own limits. Today, this is no longer possible because the free market has been replaced by something entirely different. Previously, anyone could enter the market and interact as buyers and sellers, consumers and producers. Now, markets are often virtual spaces controlled by techno-lords, who own these digital platforms and open them to vassals. These vassals connect with consumers on these platforms, forming a three-tier system: techno-lords, dependent capitalists (vassals), and free data laborers (cloud serfs). They transfer resources freely, often unconsciously, with people working in major tech companies referred to as cloud proletarians. The traditional concepts of producer, consumer, capital, and labor evolve into a four-layered structure in TechnoFeudalism, which governs the system based on these frameworks.

E.B: Thank you for your thorough explanations. I now see that techno-feudalism marks the beginning of a significantly more difficult era. Currently, on social media platforms run by giants such as the Magnificent Seven, we tend to blame ourselves for setbacks or failures rather than the system’s creators. What is the source of this manipulation we face, and what steps can we take to overcome it?

M.D: Today, we are far removed from the traditional feudal system, having passed through centuries of change. Capitalism has since developed into its current form, with some critics arguing that it has evolved into a different structure altogether. Nonetheless, Varoufakis contends that capitalism is essentially dead and suggests it is causing its own demise, often unintentionally. Although this view has its critics, we now live in a world distinct from feudalism, where capitalism has taken hold. Varoufakis illustrates this shift by comparing the old feudal system with modern capitalism, explaining why he claims, “Capitalism is dead.” He clarifies that classical capitalism relied on industrial capital, factories, machinery, and the means of production, generating profits from tangible outputs. In contrast, the rise of Techno-Feudalism introduced “cloud capital,” driven by A.I., algorithms, and digital infrastructure that influence behavior. Market dynamics are crucial here. Historically, capital moved freely, with markets largely self-regulating without government interference, though in practice regulatory bodies played a role. This ideal of a self-regulating market dates back to Adam Smith, with the metaphor of the invisible hand suggesting prices formed naturally through supply and demand, balancing producers and consumers.

A key aspect here was also the presence of free competition, meaning market players could compete openly. However, it’s important to recognize that this scenario assumes an idealized system. In the Techno-Feudal system, the rules are dictated directly by the technology lord, who employs algorithms to control them. As a result, true competition is diminished. In a free market, producers and consumers interact in an open space, but in today’s algorithm-driven markets, the platforms themselves can vary. Even on the same platform, algorithms may show different content, eroding the concept of free competition. Instead, interactions occur within a pre-defi ned environment. Economically and in terms of profit, maintaining a balance between producers and consumers is essential for the system’s functioning.

The main factor is profit. Capital’s primary goal is to accumulate more capital. In classical capitalism, profit derives from goods and services through the mechanism of surplus value. But in the Techno-Feudal model, each actor on digital land is taxed; Varoufakis describes this as feudal tax, commission, or rent income. Traditionally, market actors do this voluntarily. Here, I speak ideally, but to access cloud services, everyone must pay a fee to the cloud or feudal lords. The entire system operates on this structure. Unlike the classical system, where the aim was to maximize capital through reinvestment in innovation and development, the era of techno-lords does not require such reinvestment. They also need to innovate and develop new technology, while facing competition in that area. Varoufakis argues that, traditionally, the return on investment in money generates a certain level of employment, which is true. However, in the economy shaped by techno-elites, employment becomes less central than in the traditional system. This is evident in comparing the number of workers in a factory to those in a tech company: since technology drives the process, fewer employees are needed. These companies can manage operations internally, and the fact that money isn’t circulating back into the market poses additional issues. Notably, tech giants often make significant moves during times of crisis. Varoufakis highlights this, especially citing the 2008 crisis and the subsequent pandemic period.

During economic crises, market demand always declines. As demand drops, production decreases, and traditionally, these two are interconnected. However, the focus shifts toward technological applications accessed via computers or phones. A clear example is the pandemic: people couldn’t go out, the economy suffered, and employment dropped. Meanwhile, tech companies made significant investments to reach and engage users and succeeded. Varoufakis views these actions as crucial steps in the emergence of Techno-Feudalism. Understanding these developments is vital to grasping the larger issue. In his book, he highlights these trends during 2008 and the pandemic period.

“Every like, comment, or minor interaction feeds the algorithm, contributing free labor to the tech lord’s property. It’s important to recognize that serfs hold a significant role here what once involved coercion is now voluntary service.”

During economic crises, market demand always declines. As demand drops, production decreases, and traditionally, these two are interconnected. However, the focus shifts toward technological applications accessed via computers or phones. A clear example is the pandemic: people couldn’t go out, the economy suffered, and employment dropped. Meanwhile, tech companies made significant investments to reach and engage users and succeeded. Varoufakis views these actions as crucial steps in the emergence of Techno-Feudalism. Understanding these developments is vital to grasping the larger issue. In his book, he highlights these trends during 2008 and the pandemic period.

E.B: Professor, just as those who control the means of production in the past were able to generate the greatest profits and influence society, today anyone wanting to do e-commerce is forced to use the platforms operated by these lords. Building a new system from scratch requires a huge amount of capital, so both producers and consumers become dependent on these platforms, and the taxes or profit shares you mentioned are again earned by them. Is there a way to find a solution or an alternative to this? What can we do in the future?

M.D: Initially, for this system to work, it must include four classes or strata as defined by Varoufakis: techno-lords, vassals, cloud serfs, and cloud proletarians. At the start, we identified techno-lords, followed by vassals, cloud serfs, and cloud proletarians. Cloud serfs are crucial because the system’s persistence relies on consumers. No system can operate solely through production; it must also generate profit, which involves both sellers and consumers.

Thus, cloud serfs can be viewed as free data laborers. Social media users, ordinary people producing data online, are essentially cloud serfs, often unaware of it. Everything we do -whether engaging with an app or simply remaining inactive- sustains the system. Including cloud serfs, ensuring their satisfaction, and fostering their identification with this space are vital to the system’s operation. Cloud proletarians are salaried workers for major tech firms, but cloud serfs don’t receive salaries or contracts; instead, they form a vast crowd. When everyone on Earth uses their phones and opens an app, they participate in this system. Every like, comment, or minor interaction feeds the algorithm, contributing free labor to the tech lord’s property. It’s important to recognize that serfs hold a significant role here: What once involved coercion is now voluntary service.

E.B: Sir, historically, people worked under lords for financial gain, which brought tangible benefits. Today, even on social media, we work mostly for others’ profit, effectively making us unpaid workers. From this view, the outlook appears even more bleak, doesn’t it?

M.D: Exactly. The core issue here is free labor. Exploitation has long existed in traditional capitalism. Traditionally, it was thought to occur in specific factories and production centers, but nowadays, since everyone participates in the system, the scope of exploitation has broadened. This means we can speak of universal exploitation. For example, even a small child using apps is exploited in some way within this system, contributing to it. We all serve the same purpose. In literature, concepts such as free labor, emotional labor, and platform capitalism are often discussed. Perhaps because Techno-Feudalism integrates all these ideas within a framework, it has become very popular. It offers a way to interpret and analyze all these phenomena.

E.B: Varoufakis offers a solid diagnosis of the situation. But has he proposed a solution? Should we see this work as a manifesto, and does it have the power to motivate and inspire practical change in us?

M.D: It depends on your perspective. Varoufakis simply states an observation based on his own experience. We can argue that their proposed alternatives, when added to this narrative, are lacking. He discusses well-known topics and questions whether it is possible to develop alternative approaches, like further democratizing the system. However, it does not appear that he presents a more thorough or specific alternative.

E.B: You have a work on psychopolitics. How did reading this book impact your work? Since these ideas are linked to Byung-Chul Han, did Varoufakis’s arguments alter your perspective on the topic, or were there aspects with which you entirely disagreed?

M.D: Varoufakis proposes a system concept and analyzes it structurally and from an economic policy perspective. However, for the system to operate, it also requires agents who act as its main supporters, since systems are not solely composed of structures. This led me to consider whether Techno-Feudalism could be approached through Byung-Chul Han’s lens, prompting me to write a related paper. I found they significantly influence each other; although Han doesn’t explicitly mention “Techno-Feudalism,” his description of the economic system overlaps with Varoufakis’s. Han views this as a form of neoliberalism, a regime emphasizing voluntary self-exploitation. Essentially, he argues that contemporary governance is fundamentally psychopolitical. To clarify, psychopolitics draws from biopolitics and can be seen as its modern evolution. In traditional feudal systems, biopolitics was present, and it persisted until the advent of Techno-Feudalism within capitalism. Although I use the past tense, this dynamic still exists today. However, today there is an additional element: psychopolitics. In fact, while there was coercion over the body in the past, today it extends to the soul, directly to human reactions, thoughts, and feelings. And today, these can be directed through algorithms. Tendencies are being decided by algorithms.

While biopolitics focuses on biological aspects, psychopolitics addresses the soul and mental processes. Its main purpose is to optimize mental and emotional functioning, unlike biopolitics, which aims to overcome bodily resistance for efficiency. When we join the system, we often do so voluntarily, exposing ourselves to self-exploitation. In classical capitalism, participation was not always voluntary, but today, we engage in these platforms willingly, leading to a natural shift in power dynamics. Unlike repressive systems, psychopolitical power is subtler, friendlier, and more tolerant, replacing coercion with positivity. Han refers to this as a “positivity society,” where constantly projecting positivity, appearing good, and sharing the best moments are common. Psychopolitics relies on these positive stimuli to encourage voluntary submission through an appealing narrative. Previously, gatherings and communication among people were seen as a threat to capital interests, but today, the core motivation of Techno-Feudalism is to promote instant sharing, interaction, and engagement through comments and likes. Han describes this as a process driven by voluntary, passionate participation.

“To clarify, psychopolitics draws from biopolitics and can be seen as its modern evolution. In traditional feudal systems, biopolitics was present, and it persisted until the advent of Techno-Feudalism within capitalism.”

The focus of exploitation has shifted to the soul itself, with individuals expected to become entrepreneurs of their own lives. They embed themselves into the system as entrepreneurs, all under the false sense of freedom. Inner domination bonds are internalized, leading individuals to fight themselves. Han argues that, unlike the class struggle in traditional capitalism, this internal conflict fosters superficial socialization. As people grow isolated, they fall into an illusion of social connection via virtual environments, experiencing exploitation that affects their very soul, leading to total subjugation. Not only are bodies and labor exploited, but humans also begin to self-exploit, with free will gradually diminishing within this false freedom. This aligns with Varoufakis’s concept of techno-feudalism, enriching the understanding of psychopolitics.

First, internalized domination is discussed. Varoufakis describes a production model that influences participation and user experience through internal mechanisms rather than external coercion. Returning to Han, he adds to this by introducing voluntary subjectification, highlighting that psychopolitics and Techno-Feudalism create a more individual-centered, subjective framework. The production of data and the soul is also involved; in Han’s view, data directly relates to managing emotions and desires, while for Varoufakis, data serves as a key source of new economic rent. These approaches together show that digital capitalism sources, both spiritual experiences and economic value from data. Consequently, data plays a crucial role in this post-neoliberal system.

While Varoufakis claims techno-feudalism exceeds capitalism, Han characterizes this state as neoliberal. However, Han’s focus on performance, data, subjectification, and digital surveillance aligns entirely with techno-feudalism and indicates that psychopolitics defines a post-neoliberal era. The emotional economy becomes prominent here; Han’s concept of the positivity society where individuals constantly perform, produce, and seek approval complements Varoufakis’s notion of the serf as a user driven by emotional needs. The desire for approval and sharing actions serve as mechanisms for generating data and loyalty within the techno-feudal system. Therefore, considering both together offers a complementary framework for understanding the subject’s participation and share in techno-feudalism.

“Varoufakis argues that capitalism is dead, but I believe we are still within capitalism, perhaps in a transformed form. The core issues of critical capitalism theory -such as the forces and relations of production and the relationship between capital and labor-remain unresolved.”

E.B: Lastly, is there anything you would like to say about this book? Does the book provide the conceptual tools enthusiasts need to analyze contemporary social relations? What alternatives could be suggested? Would you recommend the book as a reader?

M.D: I believe this is a must-read book. It’s engaging, accessible, and can alter our view of current social processes. Discussing alternatives is more complex. Of course, there are options, why conduct these studies if there’s no hope? Still, this remains an ongoing journey. For example, Varoufakis argues that capitalism is dead, but I believe we are still within capitalism, perhaps in a transformed form. The core issues of critical capitalism theory -such as the forces and relations of production and the relationship between capital and labor-remain unresolved.

Many share this view. That’s why I see Techno-Feudalism, like neo-liberalism, as not post-capitalist but part of capitalism. There are certainly alternative paths and methods, all part of the struggle. To explore these, we must ask, “Can we establish a more democratic internet, digital space, or economy?” and examine efforts toward that goal. Varoufakis notes that progress has largely been achieved through algorithmically driven free markets in which producers and consumers interact. But if we see these spaces as akin to the markets and agoras of ancient Greece public places where people gather the scope becomes more political and social. All these processes influence each other. Yet, when public discussion is mediated by algorithms, a different reality emerges. Considering these two dynamics together reveals a more troubling picture, as it undermines the ideal of free public discourse. Alternatives do exist and should be explored. However, this book doesn’t offer a convincing solution. Still, I believe it’s essential reading for anyone interested.

E.B: Thank you very much for your honest explanation and for sharing your insights with us. We’re pleased to have had you as our guest.

M.D: You’re welcome.

Byung-Chul Han

Reviewing Yanis Varoufakis: “Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism?” yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.