Artificial intelligence is more than just a technology; it acts as a new tool reshaping how humans perceive themselves and society. During this transformative process, how much do we truly understand AI, and what meanings do we attach to it? In this interview, where we examine not only AI’s functions but also its impact on us and seek answers to many compelling questions, Communication Scientist and Academic Ufuk Eriş responded to our inquiries.

Mustafa Burak Avcı: Welcome, Professor Ufuk Eriş. Your recent contributions to the field of communication, particularly your research on artificial intelligence, have gained recognition. Could you share a bit about yourself?

Ufuk Eriş: It wouldn’t be entirely accurate to say recent times. Because when I suggested that topic for my PhD, it was 2002. I wasn’t born into a computer-equipped home. My first encounter was in 1996 at the Computer Research and Application Center. There, I had a chat via IRC (Internet Relay Chat) with someone living in America, and I never believed that the other person was a real human. Then years passed, and I saw how technology changed people’s perspectives and thinking patterns. In 2002, I wanted to address the topic of hacker culture in Türkiye for my doctorate proposal. At that time, there were very few hackers in Türkiye, and the only well-known one was Tamer Şahin. He was featured in newspapers as the “Pajama Hacker.” It was written that he hacked the Ottoman Bank, but back then, even if hackers existed, there weren’t many places to break into. That’s why we faced a lot of difficulties with the jury.

Finding someone related to this topic was quite difficult. There was a sociologist, someone from human resources, an industrial engineer, and a communicator. It was very hard to explain my problem to them. There are people called hackers, and when I said they could break into here, they would say, “So what if they do?” Our laws weren’t even prepared for this. When you connect remotely to someone’s computer, it is considered theft. In theft cases, you take a piece of property, and that property is no longer there, but if you copy it from a database, it remains there you’re just making a copy. I have also witnessed such a significant transformation in the law.

Deniz Benzer: When you announced your doctoral topic 20 years ago, the situation you experienced is happening today with artificial intelligence. With the same sense of unfamiliarity and excitement you felt when writing your doctoral thesis, what similarities or differences do you see between that and the excitement people have towards artificial intelligence today?

U.E: Every new technology excites thinkers or those pondering this issue. The reason is always our troubles. Looking at Karl Marx, he examined the society he lived in and said something wasn’t going well. He saw that people were unhappy, researched the cause, and proposed a method to analyze societies. But what is his concern? We are not very happy in life, and the environment isn’t happy either. Nowadays, people who write and talk about every new technology wonder if it could be a cure. I think, unlike the hacker discussion era, in the age of artificial intelligence, people are only interested in its sensational aspects. No one asks which of our problems it could solve. They only care about what more artificial intelligence can do. For example, if an A.I. can do ballet, why would someone who has nothing to do with ballet culture get excited? The sensational approach is misleading. I can say for sure that in no period of history have people been so hopeless about future generations and linked their hopes to something non-human. Think about it: they said Jesus would come, and he was human… They said future generations would do this, and they were human too… We always believed that our own kind would do something good in the future. Now, that belief is gone; we talk about what artificial intelligence will do in the future, how it will be. We tend to project solutions to our life problems onto technology, which reflects a techno-chauvinist attitude.

“First, we see the word ‘robot’ in Karel Čapek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots. The word literally means slave or forced labor in Slavic languages. In the story, robots rebel and suppress humans. The question ‘Will robots take over humans?’ actually stems from the concept of rebellious slaves.”

M.B.A: There’s also an effort to alienate artificial intelligence tools. Strange philosophical questions arise, such as whether AI could be smarter than humans as individuals, or whether it would be considered human if it were on par with a person.

U.E: At a time when the possibility of humans competing with artificial intelligence is being discussed, and while such advanced technologies are being produced, a world where news is still about men who kill their divorced wives should make us think: Should our real concerns be what artificial intelligence can do? This is the culture’s surrender to technology. In the past, culture dictated and limited the use of technology. We can give the example of the samurai sword. Not everyone can wield it, and when you do, you must adhere to certain ethical codes. One of our folk songs beautifully says: ‘The invention of the rifle ruined the virtue.’ Because to use a rifle, you don’t need years of samurai discipline and culture.

When you buy a rifle, just pulling the trigger is enough. Every profession has its own cultural codes, but such things are no longer in place. You don’t need education or an ethical code to pick up a pen. When you pay, you get your computer and use it as you wish.

M.B.A: Today, you don’t even need talent; you just prompt and can have anything drawn.

U.E: It seems like we don’t really know much about what we call artificial intelligence. There are the powerful and the powerless. What we talk about is like a utopia. I always say, “Utopias turn upside down and tell the stories of the problems we face today.” Let’s say you ask the housekeeper who comes to clean your house, “If you had the means, what kind of life would you imagine, what is your utopia?” Her answer would be, “I wish I had a husband who doesn’t drink, and that he wouldn’t hit my children, for example.” At that moment, you immediately understand her everyday worries about her life. Now, if you look at the utopian narratives about artificial intelligence and read them in reverse, and see what people expect from it, you’ll realize the real problems they face today. If someone is curious about whether artificial intelligence will do this or that, they have a problem in their daily life related to it. In the past, wars would start and end, but now we experience prolonged, low-intensity conflicts that never seem to end. People still die. We are in the digital age; today, the AI robot Sofia is granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia. It won’t be given to you or me. So, the question that should be asked is, “Will artificial intelligence provide a solution to inequality among people?” When we evaluate the moral panics developed around robots, you also understand whose fear this is. First, we see the word “robot” in Karel Čapek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots. The word literally means slave or forced labor in Slavic languages. In the story, robots rebel and suppress humans. The question ‘Will robots take over humans?’ actually stems from the concept of rebellious slaves. The main issue is that those who manage these things whether under the image of a robot or not force certain people to work for much less pay, and they fear rebellion. The core motivation behind thoughts like a robot uprising or artificial intelligence turning humans into this or that is this fear.

M.B.A: There is always a current agenda regarding artificial intelligence. So, what are its cultural impacts?

U.E: Culture is no longer something naturally produced by people as it used to be. The term “degeneration”, which we refer to as cultural decay, comes from the fact that animals in Anatolia that have lost their reproductive ability are called “Yoz” (biggot). A degenerated culture loses its ability to renew and produce itself. So, what happens then? It’s like a diabetic person who can’t produce insulin and starts getting insulin

“Nowadays, all of this is considered outdated. But what is new doesn’t stay in the air; it comes from the ground. Did the bourgeoisie, the working class, and class confl icts emerge when Karl Marx spoke about them? Even during the cave era, there was a conflict between the strong and the weak.”

injections from outside. After a while, they become dependent and lose their ability to produce it themselves. Everyone used to sing folk songs, good or bad, or write poetry for the girl they loved. But now, as people start to import poetry and songs from outside, they begin to lose their ability to express themselves. The reason for this, according to the Frankfurt School, is the Culture Industry. Before the rise of the internet, this was all lost.

M.B.A: Today, habits have changed, consumption has accelerated, and production methods have evolved. What do you think about this?

U.E: Society has changed, and the social approach has changed. For example, Yusuf Atılgan’s work Aylak Adam (The Loiterer) entered a competition. At that time, there were very famous novelists like Yaşar Kemal on the jury. However, the work did not win the competition. As socialist writers, they said, ‘This bourgeoisie’s self-concern, they’re not talking about a problem or poverty.’ Today, almost everyone knows Yusuf Atılgan’s Aylak Adam. It became popular after the 1980s. Because now individuality begins to take shape, and, in a way, the individual becomes a customer. After Turgut Özal’s presidency, even our purchasing mindset changed. In the past, people would save money for a while to buy a television; they didn’t know the concept of installments. Now, people might wonder how they don’t know the concept of installments, because we quickly get used to the way we live, and it feels as if it’s been like this for a very long time.

M.B.A: Actually, with the rapid acceleration of consumption, we also lost the habit of saving cumulatively.

U.E: People now think there’s no need to accumulate things. They ask, “What’s the point of saving?” I used to download songs from the internet and listen to MP3 players. Now, my nephew tells me, “Why are you downloading these? They’re already in the cloud.” In the past, when you bought a car, it was considered a lifelong purchase, and people would give it a name. Now, it’s said that you need to change your car frequently. But this widens the gap between us and objects. People renting homes don’t even want to hammer in a nail because they don’t accept it. If you accept it, it’s hard to let go, so you end up buying something new right away. For example, you throw away every soda can you drink immediately, but you can’t easily throw away the last soda can you shared with a friend or a loved one. Someone has touched that can, and you can’t throw it away. But this situation is dangerous for the system; if you can’t throw it away, you won’t buy a new one. In short, while there are such problems in life, it’s important to see how artificial intelligence responds to them. We don’t see this in the market; people in daily life genuinely think that A.I. has a human-like intelligence.

D.B: Professor, actually, Alan Turing’s test is very important in this context. Could you tell us a little about it?

U.E: In the Turing test, a human participates, and on the other side, an artificial intelligence or robot is placed. The human asks the machine questions. If the responses make it seem like the machine is not artificial intelligence, then it passes the Turing test. But there is also John Searle’s Chinese Room example as a counterpoint. In that scenario, there is a closed room with only one window. Inside, there are some signs and instructions. You are told to look at whatever sign is shown through the window and find the corresponding instruction. Outside, a Chinese man is showing the Chinese Kanji words to the participant. The person inside the room, who does not know Chinese, finds and removes the sign that matches the question. Does the person inside the room who removes these signs know Chinese? No, they are just following instructions. Nowadays, all of this is considered outdated. But what is new doesn’t stay in the air; it comes from the ground. Did the bourgeoisie, the working class, and class conflicts emerge when Karl Marx spoke about them? Even during the cave era, there was a conflict between the strong and the weak.

D.B: After all, artificial intelligence provides us with information, and we try to measure how intelligent it is. What do you think is the level of intelligence of that artificial intelligence? Why do we consider it to be intelligence? Where does the information provided by artificial intelligence stand in the hierarchy of knowledge?

U.E: There is no zero point in IQ, which is referred to as intelligence, for example. In an IQ test, it measures how quickly a person can solve a problem or how quickly they can find the optimal timing and compatibility between purpose and means. The Frankfurt School calls this “subjective reason” or “instrumental reason.” It is a characteristic of human intellect but not the whole thing. Instrumental reason only looks at establishing a relationship between goals and means. There is also objective reason, which not only establishes the relationship between purpose and means but also questions the purpose itself.

Instrumental reason appears, for example, during Hitler’s era. When officers who inflicted various tortures on people were tried at the Nuremberg Trials, they said, “We only followed orders.” There was both means and purpose involved there. You did what was told, but isn’t the choice to do or not do it yours? Did you ever question its purpose? Currently, the most sought-after type of reason is instrumental reason, which can do what it is told very quickly and efficiently, but we do not elevate the reason that asks, “Why am I doing this?” In fact, questioning reason is what makes humans understand and interpret reality, and it helps us position ourselves accordingly.

D.B: So, should we define artificial intelligence as instrumental reason?

U.E: Of course. We constantly talk about artificial intelligence, which is a very sensational word for those who don’t know. In reality, there is a huge gap between the way artificial intelligence is described and its state in the laboratory. Every new technology can make us ask, “What is a human?” again and push us to take a step forward. Nietzsche also refers to the “Übermensch,” meaning a person who struggles with themselves. Like the phoenix, first burning and then rising anew from its ashes. Objective reason is only concerned with how fast and how many goals it can score in a game. But winning a rigged game is very difficult. The referee is biased and bribed. Since you don’t think about the game itself, you don’t notice these things, and when you fail, you blame yourself. Just as you think the problem is personal.

M.B.A: Actually, the data that artificial intelligence feeds on is a product of societal production. There is already a data algorithm that develops from what people produce. They seem to be getting their nourishment from an invisible source, as if drawn from nothingness.

U.E: Never. In fact, artificial intelligence largely feeds on garbage, on free data from the internet. This means that A.I. can think, but it can only do one task at a time. Then it can move on to another task. Because we now see life this way, we are losing the other side. Deep Blue beat Kasparov in chess, but it can’t get up and bring a glass of water. Yes, maybe it would beat you at backgammon too, but when it wins, it’s happy, and when it loses, it’s sad. We are trying to get A.I. to solve the world’s problems. To end wars, to solve inequality, to prevent crimes. But the thing is, don’t fight, don’t hit. Why don’t you take responsibility yourself? While living with the idea that we can make it do everything, we lose our human side. Recently, they asked A.I. Sophia, “What do you think about the future of the world?”

So, humans are no longer confident about their intelligence. People are becoming increasingly anxious. We fear that artificial intelligence will take away what makes us who we are. That’s why we keep asking it, “Will it do this too?” To put it simply: you have a lover, and they are unique because of a distinguishing feature. If you take that feature away, they become just like everyone else. Even if that lover remains physically present, they are no longer truly theirs. The existence of that lover is gone. That’s why one of the fundamental questions technology poses to us is: “If they take away what makes us us, will we cease to be?” On the other hand, because we’re so curious about this, we constantly try to make it do the things we do. We keep trying to understand “What is the natura humana?” and instead of thinking of it as a tool that can solve our main problems, we sit and discuss its sensationalist aspects.

D.B: Today, when we look at the internet and artificial intelligence, do you think the realm of freedom has disappeared?

U.E: I think it mostly gets lost. But it will be what we make of it. For example, the last word used for social media is “brain rot,” meaning brain decay. Fifty years ago, they called the television “the idiot box.” It’s the same old story. They say, ‘Old wine in a new bottle.’ Basically, nothing changes. We used to call social media “the Fifth Power,” the fifth force after the Fourth Estate, which is the media. It was supposed to improve the quality of so-called democracy. But I think it still has the potential if we use it properly. We need to look at why people delegate tasks they themselves are responsible for to artificial intelligence. Why do people retreat from decisionmaking mechanisms? Because it’s believed that A.I. will make better decisions. Maybe even in investments, and perhaps in political choices in the future… Why? Because it chooses the more efficient and profitable option. But for humans, truth, efficiency, and profitability don’t always align. This is true even in the founding of our country. Atatürk and his comrades wouldn’t have relied on A.I. for their efforts. It’s not feasible. The shoes are worn out, and they have holes. There’s no food, no weapons. How many places have they been attacked from? Ignorance is present. Most of the educated have died. The army is exhausted. If it were up to A.I., accepting a mandate from America would have been the most logical, efficient, and profitable choice. But we didn’t choose that. To give a personal example, the person you love so much probably wouldn’t be recommended to you by A.I. Most likely, they are the person you shouldn’t be around. Let’s identify our true problems and avoid relying solely on artificial intelligence to solve them, risking failure. Instead, the new generation should ask, ‘How can we eliminate inequality among people? How can we undo the damage affecting our environment? How can I contribute to the benefits of others beyond myself?’

M.B.A: Thank you very much for coming and providing us with valuable information, sir.

U.E: Thank you very much, everyone. It was a pleasure for me too. Kasparov against IBM’s Deep Blue computer, 1996 ai & society

Artificial Intelligence: The Alienation of Society yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

Prof. Nurdoğan Rigel, one of Türkiye’s leading communication scholars, explores the foundational approaches and critical turning points in communication studies. Her account spans from the establishment of communication faculties in Türkiye and the urban sociology tradition of the Chicago School which played a significant role in shaping the discipline to the American years of Theodor Adorno, an influential figure of the Frankfurt School who paved the way for critical theory.

Aslı Şen: Welcome, Professor Rigel. It’s wonderful to have you with us. Could we begin by getting to know you a little better?

Nurdoğan Rigel: I completed my bachelor’s degree at Marmara University, followed by my master’s and doctorate at Istanbul University. Back then, first-year students were required to do an internship. I started mine at the Turkish News Agency (THA) with great enthusiasm. Once I joined the agency, I grew to love journalism even more, as you realize you’re learning far more than what is taught in the classroom. At the time, the Turkish News Agency was regarded as the best training ground for journalism, second only to the Anadolu Agency. Of course, you learn the profession the hard way. Ultimately, you cannot expect the managers and editors at your workplace to act as mentors; they are under constant pressure to deliver news on time. They are systematic and professional, while you are in the position of a novice, hoping for guidance. In fact, my first news stories often ended up in the trash. Our editor would cross out the parts he disliked with a red pen and throw them away. I would wait for him to leave for lunch, then retrieve the stories from the trash to examine his edits and notes. I taught myself how to write news that way. I learned everything how to gather, conceptualize, and organize a story through that process of trial and error, a real “baptism by fire.” Back then, at university, we mostly took classes from business, economics, and law professors; the field of ‘communication’ did not exist yet. We had only one or two lecturers from TRT or the Cumhuriyet newspaper, and they rarely attended classes. We were essentially emerging from an intellectual vacuum, and we had to fill that void through our own efforts. Every Tuesday and Thursday, foreign magazines arrived at the agency. I learned a great deal from them, particularly Newsweek and Time. Even just scanning the headlines in those magazines builds a significant body of knowledge a realization that truly hits you years later. Moreover, this environment forces you to develop reflexes: to think, read, and write at lightning speed. That muscle memory develops over time. It is a process you don’t notice while you are living it, but you realize how it shaped you years later, when you look back or when asked about it by others. Once that happens, you can never truly leave journalism.

Mustafa Burak Avcı: Professor, what led you to pursue a path in academia?

N.R: While I was learning so much at the Turkish News Agency, I found I couldn’t tear myself away from the university; my intellectual thirst was still very much alive. It was through the late Toktamış Ateş, a prominent professor at Istanbul University’s Faculty of Economics who frequently visited the agency, that I learned about the establishment of the Institute of Social Sciences. I wasn’t about to miss that opportunity, so I applied immediately.

Following my master’s and PhD studies, and I realized I had grown to love Istanbul University even more. Perhaps the influence of the distinguished professors from the law, political science, and business faculties played a role.

At the time, it was clear that Public Relations was closely intertwined with the field of Business School. The academic language of the other disciplines was quite challenging; law, as we know, has its own dense syntax, and political science, while somewhat more accessible, was still demanding. International Relations remains my great love, and because I approached it with genuine passion, political science became easier to engage with. Yet, I could never bring myself to like law even though I knew I had to master its language. Business Administration and Political Science ended up being my favorite areas of study. You see, back in that era, the field of communication science didn’t yet exist in Türkiye. The disciplines were structured as follows: Journalism and Public Relations, and Radio and Television; cinema was added later on. I pursued my master’s degree in Public Relations and Journalism. My master’s thesis was titled, “The Impact of Mass Media on Elections.” The story behind this thesis is quite interesting; in journalism, we have a practice known as pulling a quote. You extract a specific element from the content. Since a journalist must write a headline, they immediately pull out a key point from the text to use as the hook.

“Park was also the first to view the city as a laboratory and to recognize that communication functions as a form of social control. Communication is, in essence, a system of control that operates so subtly you hardly notice it.”

Robert E. Park, 1930s

One day, I came across the term “Political Advertising” in an editor’s column in Newsweek. “That’s it, I’ve found it!” I thought. I decided to base my thesis on this topic. However, there were no available resources on the subject at the time. While I was wondering how to proceed, I attended a fourto-five-day conference in Istanbul as a reporter. A multitude of professors were there political scientists, media and communication scholars… We were there to cover the event, but my mind was occupied with questions for my thesis. There was one particularly significant figure present, the kind of person who possesses a magical touch they might not realize the impact of their influence, but they leave a lasting impression. Betül Mardin was one of them. She was the pioneer of Public Relations in Türkiye, and she was at that very conference. She looked quite stern, but she was an absolutely wonderful lady. I approached her and explained my predicament. one day she called me to her office. “I will bring you an article from Time; you will see that political advertising is right there.”

I honestly thought that someone so incredibly busy and preoccupied would have forgotten all about me. But no, she hadn’t forgotten at all; she had actually brought the article. In essence, that article became the cornerstone of my work. It was a concept that existed globally, yet here, one had to struggle just to uncover it. Indeed, by the 1983 elections, advertisers led primarily by Man Ajans began to enter the fray. At that time, I went to interview Eli Acıman, and he had told me, “Forget about journalism, kid; come join our agency.” I was so intent on becoming a ‘great journalist’ that I declined. I hadn’t yet realized how much creativity and intelligence advertising demanded, or how much it could have contributed to my development. That remains one of my regrets.

I managed to complete the thesis somehow, and it became the very first study in this field in Türkiye. After that, I realized I had become someone who was constantly in pursuit of new concepts. I then pursued my Ph.D. in Radio and Television. After completing my master’s degree in Journalism and Public Relations, I decided to switch perspectives and see what I could learn from the other side of the discipline. My doctoral thesis examined how satellite and cable broadcasting technologies would lead to significant legal challenges, as they would either render existing laws obsolete or simply outpace them.

I used the Gulf War as a case study. I later adapted this thesis into a book titled The Electronic Renaissance (Elektronik Rönesans). Subsequently, I published several other books, including Media Lullabies (Medya Ninnileri), Dream Blindness (Rüya Körleşmesi), News, Children, and Violence (Haber, Çocuk ve Şiddet), and News in Message Design (İleti Tasarımında Haber). Afterward, I had the opportunity to experience three American universities, and these institutions contributed significantly to satisfying my intellectual hunger.

Robert E. Park and Clara Cahill Park, at Chicago Campus.
University of Chicago Photo Archive, apf1-06709.

“Though rarely acknowledged, one of the most pivotal figures in Chicago was Jane Addams, the first American woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. She led a massive charitable institution and was the primary source of support for the University of Chicago faculty most notably Robert Park in their urban studies.”

The main campus of the University of Chicago, where Robert E. Park
conducted his academic work (Hyde Park, Chicago).

The first was Florida International University (FIU). Compared to others, it had a modest library, yet it was where I first witnessed that libraries did not have to close at five o’clock; they operated 24/7. It felt like a place where you could simply live and never leave. Because I would stay in the library until midnight, my closest friend became the campus police officer.

I still remember sitting down and crying when I counted 360 references for my thesis at FIU. While back home we could find virtually nothing, here, even in a small-scale university library, I could access 360 sources directly relevant to my thesis. That was the moment I realized that the core of the matter had long been settled elsewhere.

Afterward, I went to Texas A&M University. When I joined the doctoral courses on “Digital Storytelling” I saw that two professors could co-teach a single course: one week it was taught by a professor from Computer Science, and the next week I taught it from a discourse-based perspective. It is not exactly easy to conduct a course like that in our system; here, professors would often clash over turf. However, there was no such friction there. I learned a great deal from them as well.

Then there was Brandeis University in Boston another institution that contributed immensely to my development. I supervised a few theses there, too. These experiences likely led me to view communication studies through an American perspective. Of course, years later, one sees one’s own academic trajectory crystallizing. Self-discovery is a process that takes years. Essentially, I found myself shifting from a Francophone perspective to an American one. This was not something I did intentionally; it was a natural byproduct of the fact that the data and information were originating from that source.

During this process, I realized that I was delivering course content heavily rooted in the American tradition of communication studies. Throughout this time, I developed 24 distinct courses. Among these, there are two that I regret most not having had the chance to fully implement: Media and Diplomacy and Communication and Space. You will notice that when I designed the Communication and Space course, I drew heavily on the Chicago School.

Jane Addams with children at Hull House, 1930s.

A.Ş: How did communication studies emerge, and why is the Chicago School significant in this context?

N.R: When you trace the foundations and history of communication studies, you inevitably encounter the Chicago School. They were working primarily on sociology, barely realizing that they were laying the groundwork for what would become communication studies. The key to understanding this transition lies with Robert Ezra Park. If you examine Robert E. Park’s biography, you see he possessed a robust background in journalism. The moment a journalist steps into the realm of sociology, everything shifts. It is recounted in one of the articles about him: while his doctoral students were resting, exhausted from their separate research assignments, Robert Park approached them and famously asked, “How can you sit there? How can you just sit when the city is in constant motion?” This reaction is essentially a journalistic reflex. City reporters are never meant to stay seated. Even in today’s age, you cannot simply sit at a desk and ask Google or ChatGPT, “What is going on out there?” You must be right in the city, the very place where events unfold.

Robert Park’s journalistic instinct stems from this. Park was also the first to view the city as a laboratory and to recognize that communication functions as a form of social control. Communication is, in essence, a system of control that operates so subtly you hardly notice it. The reason this discipline emerged in Chicago is that, at the turn of the last century, the city was a site of profound chaos.

Take Upton Sinclair, for instance a journalist who penned the novel The Jungle, which exposed the horrific working conditions in meatpacking plants. I remember putting the book down after only a few pages, thinking, ‘I cannot go on.’ You simply cannot bear the weight of such reality, yet this was the daily existence for people in Chicago at the time. As a journalist, Sinclair faced intense backlash for documenting these truths. Then there is John Steinbeck, whom we all know well. His Cannery Row similarly depicts the crushing poverty of that era. When you think of “America,” your mind immediately goes to Hollywood; you see no trace of destitution, only a magnificent way of life. You are conditioned to believe that is the reality, but these authors insisted that it was not. Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath does exactly the same; he was a ‘narrative journalist’ who laid bare the misery in California. Sinclair and Steinbeck were the pioneers who broke the silence on this poverty. However, that is where the media’s control mechanism kicks in. If you read Steinbeck’s Travels with Charley, you notice a staggering contrast. Suddenly, the narrative shifts from an America of misery to one of beauty, wealth, and five-star luxury. These stories were serialized in Travel magazine before being compiled into a book, and it is highly likely the editor told him, “Forget the misery; tell us about the beauty.” And just like that, America transforms into the sanitized version we know from Hollywood.

Thus, the Chicago School, together with Robert Park, positioned communication as a mechanism of social control. Though rarely acknowledged, one of the most pivotal figures in Chicago was Jane Addams, the first American woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. She led a massive charitable institution and was the primary source of support for the University of Chicago faculty most notably Robert Park in their urban studies. In fact, Jane Addams was the first to treat the city as a laboratory, even before the university did. She dedicated her life to helping street children, single parents, and the marginalized, striving to alleviate their suffering. Although her name appears in few textbooks, she is of profound significance. She meticulously mapped the city’s crime patterns, focusing on which neighborhoods reported the highest rates, the root causes of these offenses, and potential remedies. Addams made these issues visible by analyzing their causes and solutions, while Robert Park translated these into academic language and established them as an academic subject.

However, Park’s work does not aim to generate solutions perhaps because he does not view the core purpose of academia as problem-solving. When we begin to formulate our thesis regarding the Chicago School as the foundational element of communication sciences, two concepts emerge: should the field be approached through the lens of the “Sociology of Communication” or “Media Sociology”? These are not synonymous or interchangeable terms; the Sociology of Communication is a macro-concept, whereas Media Sociology is a micro-concept. When you examine the field through the lens of the Sociology of Communication, the sociological influence is far more pronounced. This is why I believe the Chicago School and the Sociology of Communication should be discussed in tandem. When viewed through the lens of Media Sociology, however, the landscape changes. This concept only gained prominence in the 1960s, as the full impact of television following the Second World War remained largely unrecognized until that decade. It was only after the late 1960s that this influence truly began to be felt. For instance, when the series Dallas began airing in Türkiye in the 1980s, we noticed that the streets were completely deserted during its broadcast. This was quite an anomaly for that era, especially in a city like Istanbul, which is bustling 24/7. Back then, people structured their entire schedules around Dallas. It aired on Thursdays, I believe, and we would deliberately avoid making plans for that evening. Dallas serves as one of the primary examples of how the media transformed everyday life. It demonstrated to those in power how everyday life could be controlled or ‘colonized,’ if you will by media narratives. Whether you label it as power or a control mechanism, the effect was the same.

“When I first started teaching, a student of mine once told me: ‘You are trying to teach us so many things, but first, teach us how to think.’ That was a profoundly important lesson for me. So, how do we teach that? Through critical theory.”

This brings us to Jürgen Habermas’s concept of “communicative action.” The idea of the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’ ultimately belongs to Habermas. If we set aside the Sociology of Communication for a moment and look at the public sphere through the lens of communicative action, we see that these two concepts are foundational and highly adaptable across every domain of communication. Years ago, at a conference, I suggested that the public sphere had essentially morphed into a private sphere. Other academics did not receive this well at the time. But look at us now are we not living in a “private sphere” on social media? Everything that was once intimate and private has become shareable, and this is done entirely with the individual’s own consent. Much like Chomsky’s concept of the ‘manufacture of consent,’ we are participating in this transformation of our own free will.

Foucault’s conceptualization of the “confession” reveals a specific power dynamic, and we have effectively embraced the power of social media, voluntarily confessing our lives to it. We wander about in a perpetual state of confession, and within this framework, our daily lives continue to be as Habermas would put it “colonized”  We are being colonized, quite literally. And we do this unconsciously, under the guise of mere entertainment. But has the experiential mechanism of communication ceased to function? Certainly not. The control and surveillance mechanisms identified in Chicago persist; they have simply mutated. In the past, this control was managed through censorship, propaganda, political communication, and traditional media editorial systems. None of those mechanisms are necessary now. Because we have already granted our consent; we have accepted this regime and allowed it to exploit our data and our very identities. Consequently, we are witnessing a fundamental transformation of Habermas’s concepts within a new, emerging paradigm.

Theodor W. Adorno, one of the leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School

Shoshana Zuboff, a retired professor from Harvard, conceptualizes this phenomenon as “surveillance capitalism.” Sherry Turkle, also from Harvard, coined the term “alone together.” They were among the first scholars to recognize how social life and technosociology were being reshaped by the rapid evolution of communication technology in the 1990s. It is no coincidence that these scholars emerged from Harvard. While few of Sherry Turkle’s books have been translated into Turkish, her seminal contribution to the field remains the concept of being “alone together.” Indeed, we are becoming increasingly alienated, transforming into atomized and isolated individuals. We do this willingly, wholeheartedly, under the illusion that we are enjoying ourselves. And yes, perhaps people actually are having fun.

I was watching a game show the other day. One of the contestants was an influencer who, by all accounts, seemed sensible and had a background in health sciences. When the host asked about her ultimate dream, the girl replied, “I want to be famous.” The host, who was quite sharp, responded: ‘My goal in life was simply to do what I love most. I believe that when you do what you love, you inevitably become well-known because you excel at it. Why did you reverse the process? These days, it seems everything starts from the opposite end. How do you become famous now? Through a couple of one- or two-minute clips you post on social media. The late journalist Mehmet Ali Birand used to refer to this as “the man on the street.” It is impossible to ignore how the very demographic captured by that phrase those whose sole ambition is to “become famous” has come to occupy the absolute epicenter of the system. By seizing power, they have turned the entire structure upside down, starting with democracy itself. It is plain to see how this reversal is pregnant with dangerous consequences.

For instance, early news research and media studies were characterized by an inherent elitism. This is where the ‘discourse elites’ stood out against those at the bottom of the discursive hierarchy. Even a superficial glance at traditional news sources revealed that discourse was exclusively manufactured by elites, namely political, economic, or bureaucratic figures who controlled the gates of information. However, if you look closely, starting in the 1990s, ‘third-page’ tabloid news gradually migrated to the core of the media ecosystem. The very sources Birand labeled as “people on the street” have now come to dominate the landscape via YouTube, the internet, and social media. In other words, as the former underclasses of discourse began to dictate the system, less and less space remained for the intellectual elites who were once the custodians of scientifi c and cultural knowledge. This is because the system now services a world engineered not to educate, but to entertain.

If we navigate life purely in the present, without a single thought for tomorrow, we are living under grave danger. If we look for the genesis of this entertainment-centric narrative, the answer lies in “self-help” literature. The foundational ethos of personal development is encapsulated in the phrase: “Now, today, here.” The very moment you anchor yourself solely in the “here and now,” you effectively wipe your memory clean. This tyranny of the present decimates the future while completely erasing the past. Do you retain any meaningful connection to the past? Not at all. I just shared my own life story with you. In that trajectory, there was a relentless pursuit of deeper knowledge and aspirations for the future; there was a perpetual desire to learn and to teach. None of this was bound to ‘today’ it was entirely projected onto the future. Nowadays, however, because an exorbitant amount of energy is invested in the present, our daily lives are colonized, and this tyranny of the immediate is eroding the fabric of society. If we navigate life purely in the present, without a single thought for tomorrow, we are living under grave danger. When we are told that everything in our lives is going swimmingly, that is precisely when we ought to be deeply suspicious. There is even a book titled Only the Paranoid Survive. In this contemporary landscape, we are practically forced to be paranoid. Something is quietly being stripped away from us, even as we are urged to invest more and more of ourselves. We need to pause and reflect. But because we have forgotten how to think in the midst of all this noise, we cannot even manage that.

“After all, Adorno is someone with very little zest for life, who takes pleasure in nothing. You cannot expect someone who uses critical theory as ‘I will criticize everything, I will look at everything from a negative perspective’ to create music that inspires enthusiasm. He uses music solely for his elitism.”

When I first started teaching, a student of mine once told me: ‘You are trying to teach us so many things, but first, teach us how to think.’ That was a profoundly important lesson for me. So, how do we teach that? Through critical theory. And critical theory arrives with the entire corpus of the Frankfurt School. The foundational figure of this thought is Theodor W. Adorno. He is, without a doubt, the toughest nut to crack in the entire field. I recently came across a quote about him that I absolutely loved: ‘The greatest favor Adorno did was to disabuse readers of the notion that they are always smarter than the author.’ That is classic Adorno. In other words, he is implying, ‘You cannot compete with me neither in knowledge, nor intelligence, nor in your worldview.’ There is this distinct aura about Adorno that says, ‘I am brilliant, I am erudite, I am elite, and I don’t really care to accommodate you.’ Ultimately, he is saying you have a great deal to learn from him but only if you possess the patience to endure the first hundred pages, much like navigating an Umberto Eco novel.

(SPOT) So, how do we teach that? Through critical theory. And critical theory arrives with the entire corpus of the Frankfurt School. The foundational figure of this thought is Theodor W. Adorno. For example, Max Weber’s three-and-a-half to four-month journey to America fundamentally transformed sociology. It shifted the entire paradigm of European sociology and demonstrated just how pivotal religion is as a societal element. Yet, this American influence is stubbornly downplayed by the Frankfurt School, particularly by Adorno. It was only toward the end of his life, in a 30-page essay, that he finally conceded America’s profound impact. Without America, after all, the Frankfurt School would not have survived it saved their lives, quite literally. When Adorno returned to Germany, the Americans were understandably furious, thinking: ‘We rescued you and your colleagues, and without a shred of gratitude, you tore us to shreds by labeling us a “culture industry.”’ Had Adorno not witnessed that reality firsthand, he could never have conceptualized the ‘culture industry.’

Foucault, in his work on the ‘intellectual gaze,’ posits that true intellectual vision is only possible when one examines their own world from the outside. By experiencing an alien environment, you gain the rare vantage point needed to look back at your own society objectively. As long as you remain submerged within it, you are blind to its contours; you cannot map its coordinates. But once you step outside, the mind is forced into a comparative state, which is precisely what catalyzes dialectical thought. Consequently, the thinkers of the Frankfurt School owe the evolution of their paradigm to their exile in New York and, subsequently, California, where during their stay, they deliberately insulated themselves within a sort of intellectual ghetto.

(SPOT) By experiencing an alien environment, you gain the rare vantage point needed to look back at your own society objectively. As long as you remain submerged within it, you are blind to its contours; you cannot map its coordinates. But once you step outside, the mind is forced into a comparative state, which is precisely what catalyzes dialectical thought. Perhaps this is also fundamentally linked to Jewish education. Ultimately, Hebrew contains no vowels; it consists entirely of consonants, and a text cannot resonate without someone to vocalize it. The individual who provides that vocalization eventually emerges as the leader of the community. Through their erudition, their ability to decipher the text, and their capacity to narrate it, a structure reminiscent of shamanism takes shape; they regard their language as their true homeland. Language transforms into a sanctuary. When Adorno returned to Germany, he gave an interview. When asked, ‘Why did you return to Germany?’ he famously replied, ‘I did not return to Germany; I returned to the German language.’ In that single sentence, you can feel the immense suffering he endured over those eleven years of exile. He returned to his language because Adorno was a thinker who wrote from the station of the ink.

Max Horkheimer acted as his father figure. He rarely commands the spotlight, yet it is fair to say that without Horkheimer, Adorno could never have truly become Adorno. The tight-knit enclave they established among themselves in California kept them anchored and ensured their collective survival, driven by a mutual dependence that was both intellectual and material. Furthermore, there is nothing more notoriously difficult in academia than co-authoring a book; yet, during the creation of Dialectic of Enlightenment, it is evident that both thinkers possessed such a symphonic alignment of thought that they could virtually complete each other’s sentences. There was absolute equilibrium between them. Operating and writing in a second language is a harrowing endeavor. No matter how brilliant you are, it takes at least four to five years for the cognitive dominance of your native tongue to recede, and Adorno actively resisted that erosion. German was the very matrix that generated the intellectual Adorno. Consequently, he does not look favorably upon English, which he regards as secondary. Nor does he look favorably upon the place. Sometimes his friends criticize him: “Did you see this light in the sky in Germany? Why are you pushing American life so far away?” He replies, “There’s a lack of landscape.” That’s what surprises me. How can there be a lack of landscape in America? What kind of landscape could he possibly have in mind? He has the landscape of German cities in his head. The first thing you notice when you first go to America is the excess of light. The country has a completely different kind of light. His friends even get annoyed with him, saying, ‘You didn’t see this kind of light in Germany.’ But California’s scenery was supposedly insufficient… For instance, if you look at Jean Baudrillard’s America, it’s a sociologist’s America through and through. Adorno’s America, however, is just exile for him. Yet that exile saved your life; it was through that popularity there that you became ‘Adorno.’ Had he stayed in his own country, he would likely have been a failed musician or musicologist. The things he attempted to write about music were not well received anyway. After all, Adorno is someone with very little zest for life, who takes pleasure in nothing. You cannot expect someone who uses critical theory as ‘I will criticize everything, I will look at everything from a negative perspective’ to create music that inspires enthusiasm. He uses music solely for his elitism.

Of course, they all have that rigorous German education in their backgrounds. They owe their perspectives, their critical faculties, and their entire way of thinking to German discipline. In fact, Communication Studies also owes a great deal to German roots. We don’t place much importance on this here, but when you look at it, that academic and cultural cultivation whether from a place of exile or somewhere you went to learn creates very significant differences in you.

Deniz Benzer: You mentioned that Adorno’s view of America was negative. When we look at Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, we see that they also criticize Germany at one point. What are your thoughts on that work?

N.R: Unhappiness isn’t something that leaves Adorno anyway; wherever you go, you carry it with you. The Dialectic of Enlightenment is a first-year undergraduate study. After that, it should lead you to Negative Dialectics. Don’t you need a German education to rethink the Enlightenment? Otherwise, you can’t really imagine an American thinking about the Enlightenment and examining it within that framework. That’s why that German education or perhaps that continental European education is necessary. After all, by the age of twenty, the entire body of macro-knowledge has already formed in these people. After that, it moves toward choosing a direction and producing results. Of course, we must not forget that there is also the impact of the trauma seriously experienced there. The transformation of dialectics into the negative in fact, these two volumes need to be taken together. You can’t just read The Dialectic of Enlightenment and stop there. You have to complete it with Negative Dialectics. Because one was written in America, while the other was written in German upon his return. It’s impossible to create an Adorno framework without seeing both of those. But you can criticize it from this angle: there is discourse, but no action. All of his students criticize him this way. Don’t get mad at Adorno, there’s nothing to be done. It’s clear that we still learn a great deal from every text, every sentence of his…

Not everyone has to be a man of action. Academics have their own personalities, too. Some thinkers have been both men of discourse and men of action. I am also interested in the personalities of thinkers, and from what I can see, an activist character would never have emerged from Adorno. I wish everyone could be like that, but they don’t have to be. Take Herbert Marcuse, for example he’s one of them and a man of action. No one ever told him, “You’re still involved in this stuff even in your 70s.” These people are also the intellectual fathers of the ’68 generation.

The students are angry with Adorno for that reason, too: “We’re here in the squares because of you, with your ideas, but you still aren’t coming out.” Adorno doesn’t feel forced to do this. You don’t have to go out into the square. Learn, think, speak; continue your action in another way. You don’t have to be in the streets. But no one ever told Marcuse, at his advanced age, to “wander around the squares.” It’s entirely a matter of character. We all have a character, an inner drive. Something is pulling you toward it. That driving force is an innate character. If you have siblings, you know that no sibling follows another. They’re all different. There’s a formula from above. I believe in it. We’re all born with that formula, and we strive to fill it out. So don’t be angry with Adorno. He was born that way. There’s nothing to be done.

From Chicago to Frankfurt: The History of Communication Studies yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

Anthropologist and communication sciences researcher Professor Erkan Saka delves into the concept of techno-feudalism and the shift from a once-decentralized internet to a landscape dominated by a few major tech oligarchs. Exploring the structural transformation of digital platforms, algorithmic hegemony, and our increasing parallelism to “digital serfs,” Saka unpacks how Big Tech corporations control both internet infrastructure and user data without democratic oversight.

Elif Başlantı: Hello, Professor Saka. Welcome. We are very happy to have you here. Can we start by getting to know who you are?

Erkan Saka: Thank you for the warm welcome. First of all, I appreciate the invitation. I am a faculty member at Istanbul Bilgi University in the Department of New Media and Communication. I have been working on new communication technologies for many years. Overall, I am trying to do this within a field that can be considered media anthropology. And here we are today, that’s how we got here.

Mustafa Burak Avcı: We chose the topic for the special issue of the magazine we are publishing as “Techno- Feudalism”. First of all, could you tell us what Techno- Feudalism is and what we should understand when we hear about it?

E.S: I don’t study this literature directly, but roughly speaking, we can say that a number of large technology companies dominate internet usage in a feudal manner. We can’t talk about a complete monopoly, but it can also be called an oligopolistic market. Sometimes the names of seven tech companies are mentioned, sometimes even more. These companies control the infrastructure and content of the internet tools we use daily. Since there isn’t a democratic process involved, a new concept has emerged that particularly references the Middle Ages.

M.B.A: Reflecting on the 90s and 2000s, when people believed in rapid Internet progress and social democratization, thinking wars were over and to raise a quesiton: “How technological advances Given the conservative nature of techno-feudalism, how are technological advances currently able to bring feudalism back? What are we doing wrong?

E.S: It is Highlighted that the medieval concept mainly focuses on property relations. Currently, it’s hard to determine what is progressive or regressive. Surprisingly, there’s been an unexpected development: widespread disappointment across researchers, social scientists, the public, and internet users. Many were initially pessimistic, but a new communication tool still emerged, offering some benefits. It was claimed to ‘bring world peace’ and to aid democratization to varying degrees.

However, these hopes haven’t materialized today. Not only did they fail, but democratization also didn’t fully occur. The internet’s initially decentralized system has shifted toward centralization, dominated by 6-7 major companies, contradicting democratic ideals.

Initially controlled largely by the U.S., the internet’s influence was tied to American foreign policy. Now, large tech corporations feel no need to pursue democratization, as their dominance already gives them significant power. When combined with political influence, this resembles feudal sovereignty, where powerful entities can control content and exclude users at will.

M.B.A: Capitalism continuously creates monopolies and oligopolies, which are not new. History shows technological breakthroughs but today, a new discussion emerges: how did the Magnificent Seven become so wealthy? Why is the mode of production changing, and is capitalism ending? What’s different today?

E.S: Is it truly wrong to look back and evaluate? While there’s a pause before and after the internet era, similar situations likely occurred earlier. America’s golden age post-1950s was marked by technological dominance, with at least one rival, the Soviet Union, leading at times. However, within the Western world, America’s technological supremacy was clear. During that period, the system was more centralized and state-managed, yet certain brands held significant dominance. After the 1980s and 1990s, some brands gained prominence and products from the Far East entered the market. They have entered a new era, but the period preceding it was one of domination. While debates and issues like central-peripheral dynamics were discussed, today’s landscape features technology companies, which are better described as a feudal, fragmented structure rather than a unified dominion. The journey to this point traces back to the information revolution starting in the 1960s, in which industrial production gradually shifted toward information and data as the source of power. Baudrillard, whom you focus on, would likely be astounded by today’s reality if he saw it in the 1980s.

Back then, the media was less overwhelming, but information’s influence was steadily growing, a trend amplified by the internet, leading to a significant leap. Now, major tech giants are fundamentally data-driven; the transformation of information into data has become the core of power. This development partly stemmed from a lack of regulation without intervention; each company monopolized its domain. While varying in other countries, within the American system, this environment fostered such growth, with regulation only briefly considered during Democratic administrations before shifts in power. Ultimately, placing data at the center means that companies harnessing data now shape this new global order.

“The internet’s initially decentralized system has shifted toward centralization, dominated by 6-7 major companies, contradicting democratic ideals. Initially they were controlled largely by the U.S.”

M.B.A: We’ve observed similar patterns with Bitcoin and virtual currencies. When unknown enters the state realm, regulation follows. Yet, states seem to retreat regarding companies involved in techno-feudalism discussions, especially as Elon Musk consolidates power and possible sanctions are rolled back against Jeff Bezos. Could this signal a shift in the relationship between state and capital, moving away from states regulating and profiting from capital? How do you interpret this shift?

E.S: I believe it’s premature to draw such a conclusion because we still don’t fully grasp these relationships. What we do know is that the Silicon Valley myth was largely created by the American government. There’s no simple story of Stanford University was founded, leading to incredible startups, and then Silicon Valley was born. “When the U.S. fell behind the Soviet Union technologically, it responded with signifi cant investments that laid the foundation for these ventures.” The idea that “Libertarian rhetoric dominates Silicon Valley” is actually misleading, either self-deception or a false impression. Libertarians claim, “We don’t want government involvement,” yet many large companies, including Elon Musk’s, could not have amassed such power without government contracts. Therefore, the dynamics of reliance between these entities are complex. It’s not entirely accurate to say that Big Tech directly controls the U.S. government, as there are mutual interests involved. Snowden’s disclosures also demonstrated that these social media platforms provided extensive intelligence and shared data with the U.S. government. TikTok was the fi rst to challenge the American monopoly; when it achieved great success in the U.S., attempts were made to block or restrict it.

“They could scarcely escape, as they were largely regarded as the property of their feudal lord with no alternative way of life. Today, however, there are different options available to us. The situation isn’t as strict now, but most users can’t fully disconnect from the digital world.”

M.B.A: I think the closing events are still on the agenda.

E.S: Yes, I believe the ownership structure has also shifted. In U.S.A, interference in the algorithm implies a change in the entire American foreign policy. When issues arise, they claim, “Then we will intervene.” This situation has made their mutual relationship more apparent. It’s important to highlight that this is not a one-sided scenario. The U.S. government also gains significantly from these companies. When they previously advocated for internet freedom as a foreign policy issue, it was actually a form of PR aimed at countries targeted by the American government. Looking back now, this is much clearer. Additionally, it’s worth noting that last year, Big Tech was the group that lobbied the most in Washington and spent the most on lobbying. Now, these tech companies are investing even more money there than traditional capital. As I mentioned, there is a mutual relationship between them.

E.B: Since the last U.S. election, discussions on algorithmic hegemony have grown. If a Techno-Feudal system becomes fully integrated, will algorithms cause social change by limiting freedom and choices?

E.S: If the current course remains unchanged, the worst-case scenario depicted here may come true. Fortunately, people are inherently creative and always find ways to resist.

Things rarely unfold exactly as planned because, if they did, we might live in a world where our freedom is stripped away, and algorithms dominate decision-making. In fact, we already live in part in that world, where algorithmic systems influence our daily lives, yet many vulnerabilities remain. These vulnerabilities give us some room to maneuver.

If Big Tech or Elon Musk controlled everything, they would eagerly create a dystopian future, but cracks inevitably appear. History shows that leaving Big Tech unchecked often results in harmful outcomes, although most companies are not inherently malicious. They simply view the world from their own perspective. Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, for example, are focused on their own interests and rarely care about democratization worldwide. The era of Google’s “Don’t be evil” slogan is over. Without such ethical concerns, they feel no obligation to consider individual users. Consequently, it falls on us to protect ourselves.

Additionally, Big Tech’s insensitivity and ineptitude regarding social issues highlight the need for interventions at every level off civil society, initiatives, and governments. Without these efforts, as you mentioned, a dystopian future could emerge, eroding human freedom.

M.B.A: The narrative is harsh, suggesting, “You will techno-feudalize and become serfs.” Could today’s dystopia be self-created? Using social media, liking, and effort might also reinforce algorithmic hegemony.

E.S: I’m uncertain if it’s worth delving too deeply into conspiracy theories. Should we really be pulled further into such worlds? However, sometimes inducing fear can be effective in reaching those who are afraid. It’s unclear whether this is intentional or accidental. For instance, constant criticism of a group can cause people to fear them, and this fear might even lead to that group’s rise to power. I have examples in mind, but I won’t specify them. A similar pattern could exist here, but based on observations, most criticisms seem well-meaning; they aim to prevent the dystopia we’re discussing. Nonetheless, how we critique these issues matters; overly harsh portrayals might be unhelpful. Gramsci’s theories may shed more light on how hegemony is produced, especially since social media doesn’t enter our lives through bullying. It spreads quickly because it’s useful or appears so to us. Despite warnings about data privacy, people continue to use it. This is also worth considering.

E.B: Professor, based on your explanation, I see that consumers have little say and are controlled. Technofeudalism mimics feudalism through digital serfdom. What does digital serfdom mean, and how are we becoming serfs again?

E.S: The techno-feudal analogy is accurate, but I prefer not to be too harsh on the serfdom aspect. We haven’t fully become serfs yet, but the current trend suggests we are heading that way. Historically, serfs were basically the laborers of feudal lords, more like semi-slaves, since most of the land belonged to these lords. Today, a similar situation persists: the platforms we use are not truly ours, and even the content we consume may not legally belong to us. This creates a confusing scenario. Everything you produce is controlled by the platform; if it shuts down or claims to have lost your data, you have little recourse.

This bears a serious resemblance to feudalism. The key difference is that you can now leave the platform, unlike medieval serfs, who had no such option. They could scarcely escape, as they were largely regarded as the property of their feudal lord with no alternative way of life. Today, however, there are different options available to us. The situation isn’t as strict now, but most users can’t fully disconnect from the digital world. Only the elite seems capable of complete detachment from the system. If you leave most platforms, you might not lose much, which is a positive aspect. In the feudal period, survival depended on producing agricultural goods, but today, you can stay afloat even without posting photos. You just miss out on knowing what friends are doing. These platforms help us stay socially connected, but there’s no life-or-death stakes involved. Communication can continue through WhatsApp groups. While platforms haven’t completely boxed us in, it’s still difficult to break those bonds. Sometimes, switching to alternative platforms provides a welcome change. Moving your activity elsewhere is like choosing a different feudal lord, a chance that didn’t exist before and wasn’t easy to find.

M.B.A: The discussion now includes the potential takeover of internet infrastructure technology. For instance, people might say, “I’ll order from Yemeksepeti” without knowing the restaurant. Similarly, taxi stands are replaced by apps, closing traditional stands. It seems we are increasingly creating our own consent for actions.

E.S: You’re right, but as I mentioned, we’re facing a very challenging period. While contemplating how to escape this cycle of Tech-Feudalism, it’s helpful to consider broader perspectives. For instance, why do I use Uber now? I turn to Uber because taxi stands aren’t closing, yet they aren’t functioning properly, and we understand why. There are also local social issues at play. These problems are often exploited by Big Tech feudal lords they sometimes create problems deliberately and then offer solutions, or they simply build their systems atop existing issues. For example, what if children weren’t so captivated by tablets? During my childhood, I could play outside freely. The city provided space for all of us. Today, urbanization has pushed us into digital spaces. To foster real change, social policies that extend beyond the digital sphere are necessary, requiring efforts that go beyond individual action. For example, many local governments worldwide have imposed restrictions on Airbnb. The resulting issues, like increased rent and housing shortages, serve as useful indicators. I believe these local or governmental restrictions offer meaningful signals about how to intervene effectively in the system.

“If you leave most platforms, you might not lose much, which is a positive aspect. In the feudal period, survival depended on producing agricultural goods, but today, you can stay afloat even without posting photos. You just miss out on knowing what friends are doing.”

Umut Yiğit: Professor, in a previous interview with Nurdoğan Rigel, she said, “Social media platforms are invading our private space. This space is becoming both public and private.” From an anthropological and sociological view, how do you describe this transformation? Is private space becoming public? Is the nature of publicness changing, or is our daily public life transforming?

E.S: Let me respond as a true liberal: everything occurs simultaneously. We need a new conceptual framework. While the idea of the public sphere was initially evolving in this direction, the advent of algorithms made organic dissemination of content impossible. Platform-based advertising and business models also enforce this. Most platforms operate this way. Organic content is rarely shared; users must actively oppose the algorithm.

As a result, the originally freer concept of the public sphere has greatly diminished, especially due to Twitter and similar apps. Initially, Twitter was seen as a kind of public space, but over time, we began to reflect more of our private lives. New platforms and initiatives have emerged in this context. Platforms do not explicitly instruct users, but users adapt to the division of roles. Twitter (X) has a distinct structure, while Instagram is assigned a different role. TikTok used to show less of insider views. This necessitates case-by-case analysis and reconsideration of what constitutes publicness. Overall, both the public and private spheres have undergone significant transformation.

Some personal data that we previously regarded as private now appears less so. Clearly, we must reexamine ethical issues using empirical evidence. Since the situation differs across platforms, we cannot directly apply public-space debates to this context. This understanding has become evident.

U.Y: I think a new conceptual framework is needed for the answer.

E.S: Yes, definitely.

Deniz Benzer: We discussed macro-level and structural elements. Based on your anthropology background, what is the micro-level equivalent of these events? What is the relationship between structure and microscale? Does an individual have a unique tactical space, and does it narrow or expand over time?

E.S: Overall, I believe this area has become more limited. Theories by thinkers like Michel de Certeau are relevant here. While some resistance remains, it’s now much harder due to the shift of control to algorithms after the bypassing of the chronological flow. Our ability to challenge the system has thus decreased.

However, people still find ways to bypass censorship or content restrictions imposed by Big Tech through various formats, sometimes even migrating collectively. Although these collective efforts aren’t always successful, we still have the power to decide as a community, for instance, choosing to switch from WhatsApp to Signal. Individual actions rarely achieve results, but once a critical mass is reached, we can compel the system to change certain digital habits.

Recent attempts, like migrating from Twitter to Bluesky or Mastodon, have largely failed, with many returning to X. I personally returned because of the Gulf War situation, but generally, we seek sensation, spreading rumors rather than clear information. We accept chaos in exchange for constant flow. For example, the rise and fall of BeReal show our reluctance to show our natural selves; we prefer filters and poses.

We must ask ourselves the purpose behind our actions. I think we should gather on Mastodon instead of X, but participation remains low. Mastodon has functioned as an alternative for eight years, successful in ways other options haven’t been. Still, we need to understand why we’re not more involved. If we act collectively, we could send a strong message to tech giants. It’s important to view this from multiple angles, acknowledging individual self-criticism but also recognizing that some issues require broader structural regulation.

U.Y: Initially, Instagram only shared posts. As posts became more aesthetic, the “story” format was introduced. Recently, a new feature called Instant was launched, going live immediately after a photo is taken. The system constantly produces new versions to keep content creation lively amid continuous staging. From an anthropological view, how is value formed here?

Erving Goffman

E.S: Erving Goffman described this as the theatrical nature of everyday life years ago. We have always been wearing masks in our daily interactions, even before the internet. Depending on our relationships, we take on different roles, for example, with parents, students, children, or lovers. There’s always an effort to perform and present ourselves attractively. Being authentic can sometimes feel like a bold statement, but in reality, there’s no true ‘natural’ state. We shape ourselves based on the situation at any given moment. Sometimes we aim for internal consistency; other times, we can’t. So, what we see on Instagram isn’t unusual to me; it’s just our way of presenting ourselves publicly.

In this respect, Instagram exemplifies capitalism, constantly generating new commodities with the latest being the “Instant” tool. Certainly, given its vast platform, it can easily incorporate features it finds appealing from other platforms. Currently, people consume content that gives rise to new media types or metas. When users engage with these, Instagram also updates their profiles accordingly. However, humans have diverse perspectives on life. Sometimes, we want to appear natural; other times, we craft a more fictional persona. The reasons behind this variability are complex. As a media theorist, I prefer not to delve into ontological or philosophical debates. From my observations, we tend to mirror the media itself. While media can enhance certain traits we already possess, most behaviors still feel very human. There has also been discussion about “influencers”, who now often seem very artificial. It appears Instagram aims for a more natural look, despite our ongoing posing. Still, “Instant” will also be aestheticized and experimental new meta… That’s the nature of this game.

Sedat Erol: Professor, a study shows that only 20% of the social media content are the ones we ourselves choose, while 80% are ads and promoted posts created by algorithms. We think we’re following our choices, but that’s not true. If we see this feed illusion as Tech- Feudalism, how would you interpret it?

E.S: Currently, I haven’t identified a single concept to fully describe this situation. If I had, I might be famous already. Let’s consider a hypothetical scenario: Tech-Feudalism might not have developed this way; it might have followed a different path. Initially, it was quite different, with a higher chance for organic content and your own content to be noticed and spread. Over time, they devised a new business model, reducing organic growth to the levels you mentioned. Although they could have adopted another revenue stream, they effectively integrated advertising, thereby generating significant profits. Usually, when a system is thriving, people don’t question it or seek improvements for users. It continues until it fails. Currently, with no better options available, we look to Instagram and Twitter. But we know most content isn’t from the accounts we follow. TikTok, on the other hand, has been more successful with personalized content, which explains its rapid rise. Although Meta and Google know us well, they didn’t see the need for personalized content until now. Personally, I find TikTok highly effective because everything aligns with my interests. Other platforms could do the same, but their different business models prevent them from doing so. TikTok is changing now, with more ads appearing, and the content flow may shift. Platforms constantly experiment, and without strong alternatives, they manipulate us, sometimes forcing behaviors.

On YouTube, for instance, to get views, you must run ads; otherwise, watching is nearly impossible. Organic growth takes years to develop. It wasn’t always like this; it evolved over the past 4-5 years. In a few years, platforms may adopt new models that could improve content fl ow. A large user uprising could encourage a shift in system design. For example, AI tools are entirely subscription-based, with paid options pushed immediately. Social networks might evolve in different directions later, but for now, their current operation suits their business interests. We’re compelled to accept this reality.

E.B: Is it possible that what you’re describing could serve as a solution for creating a decentralized internet?

Erkan Saka: Achieving this might be partially possible. Since it hasn’t been attempted yet, the exact risks are unknown. For now, we should monitor how decentralized networks develop and function. I’m cautious because, when blockchain first appeared, it was seen as a nearly unbreakable tool against media censorship. While the immutability of content can be beneficial, it also raises concerns about disinformation. If false information is stored there, it’s impossible to modify or halt its dissemination. Once identified, such issues challenge the idea that blockchain didn’t work either, as it may cause unintended consequences. Currently, decentralization is widely regarded as necessary due to Big Tech’s overwhelming power. Nonetheless, this raises the question: “How can governance be maintained in decentralized systems?’’ We also need to consider this. Currently, social media content is quite poor, and decentralized networks do not guarantee democratization. So, what’s our next step? It’s important to reflect on these questions, but we should still explore these alternatives. The issue is that users today face a few challenges. For instance, techno-feudal lords offers such engaging content that we rarely feel the need to experiment. However, when we do try, we will better understand its potential.

“Currently, decentralization is widely regarded as necessary due to Big Tech’s overwhelming power. Nonetheless, this raises the question: ‘How can governance be maintained in decentralized systems?”’

M.B.A: Today, debates on techno-feudalism divide, with some saying, “This too shall pass,” and others claiming it’s just platform capitalism, not true techno-feudalism. As a media theorist and sociologist, where do you stand on this issue?

E.S: I don’t believe our situation is as dystopian as it might seem. The concept of platform capitalism, I see, doesn’t suggest greater freedom or equal competition. We’re not equally involved in it. Our ability to influence capitalist dynamics is limited. At first, large monopolies regulate and oversee the system. That’s why we’re still in a transitional phase. For example, the impact of artificial intelligence remains uncertain; its transformative potential could shake up the current order. Google, which primarily earns through search, might not fall overnight but could gradually lose importance if it fails to develop new revenue streams. Its dominance as a search engine might diminish. Compared to old feudal lords, tech-oligarchs also operate within quite fragile structures.

“During Trump’s first election, a company called Cambridge Analytica utilized Facebook data to support his campaign. While I don’t believe they alone secured his victory, especially since the Democrats were quite weak, they played a role in micro-targeting voters in what are known as ‘swing states.’ These were states with close votes between Democrats and Republicans, where campaigns tailored their slogans and messages to influence voters.”

E.B: Professor, you mentioned search engine mechanisms. Our data is stored digitally, and our behaviors are commodified. Do these practices deepen surveillance capitalism? How does this exchange ecosystem shape individual political and ideological consent?

E.S: Data analysis and the use of personal data are highly advanced today. Humans are complex; at sub-human or super-human levels, vast amounts of data about us are collected and can be directed. This is already utilized in the commercial sector to stimulate consumption. The internet ordering systems and digital transformation are particularly advanced. My hope is that humans are not entirely stable; we change frequently, and so these mathematical models work to some degree. However, human behavior patterns start to evolve, requiring ongoing analysis. This creates a continuous data chase. Nonetheless, existing data remains valuable. For example, the Cambridge Analytica case, though not very effective overall, appears to have influenced voter behavior during critical moments.

M.B.A: Could you explain a bit more about Cambridge Analytica?

E.S: During Trump’s first election, a company called Cambridge Analytica utilized Facebook data to support his campaign. While I don’t believe they alone secured his victory, especially since the Democrats were quite weak, they played a role in micro-targeting voters in what are known as “swing states.” These were states with close votes between Democrats and Republicans, where campaigns tailored their slogans and messages to influence voters. At that time, Trump nearly won all of these swing states, and the Democrats could have won, too. This illustrates how subtle factors can influence human behavior and lead to specific outcomes. Today’s data is valuable for this purpose, giving those in power influential tools. However, it’s not always effective because people don’t always follow consistent patterns. If they did, sociology and anthropology wouldn’t be needed. Humans can act unexpectedly, which offers hope, but we also follow observable behaviors. That makes data crucial and widely use of data may can shape many of our consumption habits, though we do have some room to escape. In politics, this is even more evident. For instance, when I buy something for personal use, I tend to follow straightforward recommendations. But in political decisions, I don’t always do that, leaving some space for autonomy.

Murat Uluk: When Mansur Yavaş was first elected, he created an alternative to Yemeksepeti, saying, “Restaurants can find a place here, with no commission.” Can municipalities develop apps to break major app monopolies and store data locally?

E.S: The concept of “commons” shared resources relates more to collective situations. For instance, platforms like Facebook could be nationalized gradually. If Mark Zuckerberg finds they aren’t profitable, he might give up, allowing these platforms to become foundations. Many internet services follow this model; Wikipedia is a prime example. It’s the largest data repository, run by a foundation, which could attract advertising but chooses to rely on donations. The internet’s core pillars include organizations like Archive.org and foundation-based models. Although not yet applied directly to social media, these models could be adapted. Such projects are costly and require involvement from local governments or civil initiatives.

Crucially, we should apply lessons learned about the purpose of this service and how its algorithm should reflect that. Transparency in algorithms is vital, especially for public work, as it enables collective input. If an algorithm produces negative outcomes, citizens can support improvements. This approach has proven effective in various cases, though some initiatives, like the Ankara application, didn’t continue. Successful implementation requires good logistics. I believe much of this will become a public activity again. For example, municipal Wi-Fi services were once a form of public service, were later restricted, and could be reintroduced. Governments are increasingly concerned with digital and data sovereignty, leading to more user-supported public efforts. While China and Russia have established their own systems, with genuine goodwill and focus on the user, such models can succeed. Nothing is impossible.

M.U: Professor, considering your experience with FriendFeed and MySpace, how did the ideas you had back then shape your expectations for today?

E.S: There was definitely more hope. Now, I view the internet’s state more critically. In fact, internet users themselves can be problematic. FriendFeed could have thrived independently; those who didn’t maintain it are actually us. There’s a Turkish site where many content pieces are uploaded. I believe this site could have become as popular as Reddit globally. However, the owners acted so greedily and disregarded the users that they initially made good money, but then ruined the platform. I think that site is no longer viable and will gradually fade away. They declared, “Sovereignty must be entirely ours, and there shouldn’t even be moderators. Let’s make money first, then consider other things.” Their greed caused them to lose their standing as a trusted source. I observe similar patterns in the independent media environments I engage with. Friends who receive funding quickly leave us. We actually have talented people, supportive environments, and user potential. Most of the time, we lose because we’re too opportunistic. When faced with this, the Techno-Feudals approach us and

S.E: Professor, about 4-5 months ago, you appeared as a guest on a podcast where your insights on artificial intelligence and academia truly stood out to me. I would like to hear your overall thoughts on how artificial intelligence relates to education.

E.S: It’s been approximately 5-6 years since the emergence of productive artificial intelligence. In my view, this represents the most notable technological shift since the rise of the internet. Although social media, the metaverse, and mobility haven’t directly influenced our curriculum, artificial intelligence has. This creates a serious challenge. For the first time, we need to ask questions like, “How will we handle exams or homework?” Previously, we might have said, “They just copy from Wikipedia,” which was a minor concern. Now, even plagiarism detection tools like Turnitin are ineffective. This technology also directly challenges teachers. We need to reconsider how we deliver education. While students go through their own learning processes, the academic landscape is more impacted because peers work is now easier to access. There’s also an epistemic issue at play. How do we acquire knowledge today? Previously, we complained that “People aren’t reading,” yet some reading still occurred. Now, many rely on a single platform: asking an A.I., which often provides an answer accepted as the final truth. Historically, we would consult Wikipedia or other sources and synthesize information. This over-reliance on A.I. answers raises a serious epistemic crisis, as convenience grows and people stop verifying sources, accepting single answers as truth. This erodes the multi-step process of gathering information, which was educational in itself, prompting questions like “Where should I look?” and “What should I do?” The future is uncertain, but it’s said to engender mental laziness. While this may be partly true, users know that A.I. responses aren’t always sufficient. We adapt by rephrasing prompts to better achieve our goals. I don’t want to present a wholly negative view; even with A.I., we understand that the results are not always adequate on their own, leading us to refine our questions for better answers.

We are still activating our minds, but we’re at a different stage now. It seems we’ve entered a period of transformation. From an academic standpoint, producing writing is now very easy, which can be problematic. Those who criticize this don’t fully understand how the academic process works. Most academics can usually tell if a text was produced by A.I. because academic writing involves a process. Ultimately, more content is being generated. The key question then becomes, “How will your work stand out in this growing pool?” When conducting a literature review with tools like Google, an algorithm runs in the background. Based on your search criteria, your work is either highlighted or overlooked. For instance, I asked A.I. tools such as Elicit, Consensus, and Google Academic Labs, which focus on my main research area, to find my publications. One tool showed my work, while the others did not, and we don’t know how they select results. The question now is, “Whose publications are highlighted?” Could this introduce a new form of data colonialism? We’re still early in these debates. Additionally, there’s concern about what data A.I. is trained on and what information it processes. I’m indirectly involved in a TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye) project to develop a Turkish Large Language Model (LLM). I’m monitoring how local knowledge is incorporated, as existing global models have limited Turkish data. How will Türkiye’s data be integrated into these models? Countries are developing their own language models, but the quality and content inclusion during construction are crucial.

Academic input could be valuable here, though the process remains complex. There’s also a sectoral aspect: industry believes that sector-specific texts will boost personalized learning, a view I share. It’s beneficial if students want to learn a language or other skills, that’s very positive. We used to struggle with this, often unable to solve certain problems. Perhaps A.I. can clarify these matters for us more effectively. However, questions remain about how it will explain and to whom. This is another concern. I believe we are going through the greatest test since the internet’s arrival. That’s my perspective.

M.B.A: Is it necessary to create initiatives against AI, Techno-Feudalism, and digital companies, individually or collectively? Should we, like Luddites, reject AI altogether? How should we position ourselves within this process? Or should we accept our fate and wait for universal income? What are your thoughts?

Erkan Saka: Earning that income is challenging for us, which is why waiting isn’t an option. Although it would be ideal to wait and enjoy a comfortable retirement, we need to actively support all initiatives and open-source projects within our capacity. Standing behind everyone and making an effort is important. We should also contribute to Wikipedia, which is very strict against A.I. generated content. They employ A.I. bots for editing, but all content is verified by human editors and moderators, which is impressive.

Currently, Wikipedia and its sister projects represent some of the most human-produced content, making them important examples in opposition to AI-generated material. Supporting these efforts is crucial. As a community, we can’t stay disconnected; only a small minority can completely avoid digital life, which most of us depend on to sustain ourselves. Resistance from within is possible, such as reviewing our consumption patterns to reduce intake. Some issues, such as the sector’s concept of “multitasking,” are macro-level and beyond individual control. We need to understand what true “multitasking” actually involves and when it’s appropriate. I love “multitasking” and I believe that I do it very well. However, many people just open multiple screens, thinking it’s effective. It’s important to deconstruct concepts like productivity and ask what real efficiency and results truly mean. We should reassess these ideas for ourselves. I believe in these concepts and strive to improve my efficiency, but beyond sector-imposed language and advertising, we need to find what’s beneficial for us and our environment. This requires internal effort, and sharing ideas and experiences collectively is vital.

“Through mutual learning, we can work more efficiently and live healthier lives. Certainly, beyond this, regulations must be enacted by top-level executives, as that’s the only way to effectively combat these issues. Civil initiatives are definitely valuable.”

With over ten new A.I. tools emerging daily, sharing our insights helps us avoid wasting time. Through mutual learning, we can work more efficiently and live healthier lives. Certainly, beyond this, regulations must be enacted by top-level executives, as that’s the only way to effectively combat these issues. Civil initiatives are defi nitely valuable.

I have a story related to this about 15 years ago, I was walking in Berlin after an event when I saw a group of 15-20 people protesting against Big Tech’s use of our personal data. I initially thought, “What impact can this small group have?” and felt a bit sad. Now, however, the European Union is known for its strict personal data regulations, controlling a vast market with significant influence. The system they’ve put in place is effective, maybe not perfect, but it exists. Reflecting on this, I realize those small efforts and initiatives led to meaningful outcomes. I still believe that a sphere of influence can be established. Today, X is sometimes used to seek justice, showing that these platforms aren’t empty spaces. Still, our work to establish reliable sources must continue, including creating digital archives and mastering control over information and data. That’s why I focus on my website for my main content. While I share on social media to increase interaction, it’s not my primary communication channel. Engagement often offers no real benefits and can even work against us. Sometimes, it’s better to remain unseen.

M.B.A: Thank you very much for participating then.

Erkan Saka: Thank you very much. I am honored.

The Illusion of Daily Life: “The Era of ‘Don’t Be Evil’ is Over” yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.