Communication sciences researcher Mert Demir examines Yanis Varoufakis’s highly debated book Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism? He explains the structural shift from traditional market economies to a new digital paradigm. Exploring the rise of cloud capital, algorithm-driven platforms, and our modern roles as “cloud serfs,” Demir connects Varoufakis’s economic framework to Byung-Chul Han’s concept of psychopolitics.

Elif Başlantı: Welcome. Could you introduce yourself?

Mert Demir: Hello, thank you very much. I am Mert Demir, a research assistant at Istanbul Beykent University. I am also pursuing a Ph.D. in Communication Sciences at Marmara University, where I am currently writing my thesis. My main research interests lie in the sociology of communication.

E.B: In our seventh issue, we focused on Techno-Feudalism as the main theme. Can you share insights about the book Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism?, a key work that introduced this idea and established its theoretical basis?

M.D: Yanis Varoufakis highlights that as digitalization, the platform economy, artificial intelligence, automation, and especially algorithms evolve, they are reshaping existing production relations. Collectively, these elements are forming a new type of production system that exists outside the traditional capitalist framework.

E.B: A key strength of the book is its narrative, centered on a father-son dialogue, employing language that is informal and relatable. As a reader, what are your impressions of the book’s tone and storytelling style?

M.D: Varoufakis approaches this book not as an academic work but as a conversational response to an old discussion with his father. This simple, accessible style is consistent with his other writings on capitalism and related topics. He enjoys explaining complex ideas in a way that the public can understand, which we might call popular science or accessible writing. His skill in this area contributes to the book’s popularity, as it is written in a way that anyone can read and grasp. I find this valuable because if it had been written in an academic tone, its impact would likely have been less. Though others have addressed similar ideas before, this book is especially notable for its successful popularization of those concepts. Overall, it is a highly impactful book in terms of popularity.

E.B: This book isn’t primarily focused on solving problems; rather, it contributes new ideas to the literature. For instance, it introduces novel class categories like cloudalists alongside the traditional capitalist bourgeoisie, and cloud proletarians alongside ordinary proletarians. You noted that the book is somewhat detached from existing literature. Does it provide a strong conceptual framework to justify this observation?

M.D: The explanation largely matches existing literature, though his style and structure differ from our usual expectations. Before diving deeper, we should clarify Varoufakis’s perspective on this capitalist transformation. How does he describe this shift? How does he frame it? Let’s explore that. The concept of Techno-Feudalism is rooted in scholarly work, and Varoufakis highlights lesser-known aspects, making the idea more accessible. His main point is that our traditional capitalism has been replaced by a new system what he calls Techno-Feudalism because communication technologies now operate outside the traditional market mechanisms. Historically, feudal economies were land-based; with land owned by feudal lords, vassals in the middle, and peasants at the bottom. Feudalism centered on landownership, with lords owning the land and vassals paying rent or dues. Peasants worked the land within this hierarchy. This system shifted with the advent of modern capitalism, which replaced feudalism with an industrial economy. Capitalist ideology promoted the idea that capital and commodities could circulate freely, emphasizing the importance of commodities and money. This promise was that capital could move without restrictions, underpinning the focus on individual capitalists, and aligning with liberal economic principles. However, while capital was viewed as free to move, the free movement of labor was rarely acknowledged.

“Varoufakis emphasizes that, although the old ideal was perfect, the system once operated within its own limits. Today, this is no longer possible because the free market has been replaced by something entirely different.”

Varoufakis emphasizes that, although the old ideal was perfect, the system once operated within its own limits. Today, this is no longer possible because the free market has been replaced by something entirely different. Previously, anyone could enter the market and interact as buyers and sellers, consumers and producers. Now, markets are often virtual spaces controlled by techno-lords, who own these digital platforms and open them to vassals. These vassals connect with consumers on these platforms, forming a three-tier system: techno-lords, dependent capitalists (vassals), and free data laborers (cloud serfs). They transfer resources freely, often unconsciously, with people working in major tech companies referred to as cloud proletarians. The traditional concepts of producer, consumer, capital, and labor evolve into a four-layered structure in TechnoFeudalism, which governs the system based on these frameworks.

E.B: Thank you for your thorough explanations. I now see that techno-feudalism marks the beginning of a significantly more difficult era. Currently, on social media platforms run by giants such as the Magnificent Seven, we tend to blame ourselves for setbacks or failures rather than the system’s creators. What is the source of this manipulation we face, and what steps can we take to overcome it?

M.D: Today, we are far removed from the traditional feudal system, having passed through centuries of change. Capitalism has since developed into its current form, with some critics arguing that it has evolved into a different structure altogether. Nonetheless, Varoufakis contends that capitalism is essentially dead and suggests it is causing its own demise, often unintentionally. Although this view has its critics, we now live in a world distinct from feudalism, where capitalism has taken hold. Varoufakis illustrates this shift by comparing the old feudal system with modern capitalism, explaining why he claims, “Capitalism is dead.” He clarifies that classical capitalism relied on industrial capital, factories, machinery, and the means of production, generating profits from tangible outputs. In contrast, the rise of Techno-Feudalism introduced “cloud capital,” driven by A.I., algorithms, and digital infrastructure that influence behavior. Market dynamics are crucial here. Historically, capital moved freely, with markets largely self-regulating without government interference, though in practice regulatory bodies played a role. This ideal of a self-regulating market dates back to Adam Smith, with the metaphor of the invisible hand suggesting prices formed naturally through supply and demand, balancing producers and consumers.

A key aspect here was also the presence of free competition, meaning market players could compete openly. However, it’s important to recognize that this scenario assumes an idealized system. In the Techno-Feudal system, the rules are dictated directly by the technology lord, who employs algorithms to control them. As a result, true competition is diminished. In a free market, producers and consumers interact in an open space, but in today’s algorithm-driven markets, the platforms themselves can vary. Even on the same platform, algorithms may show different content, eroding the concept of free competition. Instead, interactions occur within a pre-defi ned environment. Economically and in terms of profit, maintaining a balance between producers and consumers is essential for the system’s functioning.

The main factor is profit. Capital’s primary goal is to accumulate more capital. In classical capitalism, profit derives from goods and services through the mechanism of surplus value. But in the Techno-Feudal model, each actor on digital land is taxed; Varoufakis describes this as feudal tax, commission, or rent income. Traditionally, market actors do this voluntarily. Here, I speak ideally, but to access cloud services, everyone must pay a fee to the cloud or feudal lords. The entire system operates on this structure. Unlike the classical system, where the aim was to maximize capital through reinvestment in innovation and development, the era of techno-lords does not require such reinvestment. They also need to innovate and develop new technology, while facing competition in that area. Varoufakis argues that, traditionally, the return on investment in money generates a certain level of employment, which is true. However, in the economy shaped by techno-elites, employment becomes less central than in the traditional system. This is evident in comparing the number of workers in a factory to those in a tech company: since technology drives the process, fewer employees are needed. These companies can manage operations internally, and the fact that money isn’t circulating back into the market poses additional issues. Notably, tech giants often make significant moves during times of crisis. Varoufakis highlights this, especially citing the 2008 crisis and the subsequent pandemic period.

During economic crises, market demand always declines. As demand drops, production decreases, and traditionally, these two are interconnected. However, the focus shifts toward technological applications accessed via computers or phones. A clear example is the pandemic: people couldn’t go out, the economy suffered, and employment dropped. Meanwhile, tech companies made significant investments to reach and engage users and succeeded. Varoufakis views these actions as crucial steps in the emergence of Techno-Feudalism. Understanding these developments is vital to grasping the larger issue. In his book, he highlights these trends during 2008 and the pandemic period.

“Every like, comment, or minor interaction feeds the algorithm, contributing free labor to the tech lord’s property. It’s important to recognize that serfs hold a significant role here what once involved coercion is now voluntary service.”

During economic crises, market demand always declines. As demand drops, production decreases, and traditionally, these two are interconnected. However, the focus shifts toward technological applications accessed via computers or phones. A clear example is the pandemic: people couldn’t go out, the economy suffered, and employment dropped. Meanwhile, tech companies made significant investments to reach and engage users and succeeded. Varoufakis views these actions as crucial steps in the emergence of Techno-Feudalism. Understanding these developments is vital to grasping the larger issue. In his book, he highlights these trends during 2008 and the pandemic period.

E.B: Professor, just as those who control the means of production in the past were able to generate the greatest profits and influence society, today anyone wanting to do e-commerce is forced to use the platforms operated by these lords. Building a new system from scratch requires a huge amount of capital, so both producers and consumers become dependent on these platforms, and the taxes or profit shares you mentioned are again earned by them. Is there a way to find a solution or an alternative to this? What can we do in the future?

M.D: Initially, for this system to work, it must include four classes or strata as defined by Varoufakis: techno-lords, vassals, cloud serfs, and cloud proletarians. At the start, we identified techno-lords, followed by vassals, cloud serfs, and cloud proletarians. Cloud serfs are crucial because the system’s persistence relies on consumers. No system can operate solely through production; it must also generate profit, which involves both sellers and consumers.

Thus, cloud serfs can be viewed as free data laborers. Social media users, ordinary people producing data online, are essentially cloud serfs, often unaware of it. Everything we do -whether engaging with an app or simply remaining inactive- sustains the system. Including cloud serfs, ensuring their satisfaction, and fostering their identification with this space are vital to the system’s operation. Cloud proletarians are salaried workers for major tech firms, but cloud serfs don’t receive salaries or contracts; instead, they form a vast crowd. When everyone on Earth uses their phones and opens an app, they participate in this system. Every like, comment, or minor interaction feeds the algorithm, contributing free labor to the tech lord’s property. It’s important to recognize that serfs hold a significant role here: What once involved coercion is now voluntary service.

E.B: Sir, historically, people worked under lords for financial gain, which brought tangible benefits. Today, even on social media, we work mostly for others’ profit, effectively making us unpaid workers. From this view, the outlook appears even more bleak, doesn’t it?

M.D: Exactly. The core issue here is free labor. Exploitation has long existed in traditional capitalism. Traditionally, it was thought to occur in specific factories and production centers, but nowadays, since everyone participates in the system, the scope of exploitation has broadened. This means we can speak of universal exploitation. For example, even a small child using apps is exploited in some way within this system, contributing to it. We all serve the same purpose. In literature, concepts such as free labor, emotional labor, and platform capitalism are often discussed. Perhaps because Techno-Feudalism integrates all these ideas within a framework, it has become very popular. It offers a way to interpret and analyze all these phenomena.

E.B: Varoufakis offers a solid diagnosis of the situation. But has he proposed a solution? Should we see this work as a manifesto, and does it have the power to motivate and inspire practical change in us?

M.D: It depends on your perspective. Varoufakis simply states an observation based on his own experience. We can argue that their proposed alternatives, when added to this narrative, are lacking. He discusses well-known topics and questions whether it is possible to develop alternative approaches, like further democratizing the system. However, it does not appear that he presents a more thorough or specific alternative.

E.B: You have a work on psychopolitics. How did reading this book impact your work? Since these ideas are linked to Byung-Chul Han, did Varoufakis’s arguments alter your perspective on the topic, or were there aspects with which you entirely disagreed?

M.D: Varoufakis proposes a system concept and analyzes it structurally and from an economic policy perspective. However, for the system to operate, it also requires agents who act as its main supporters, since systems are not solely composed of structures. This led me to consider whether Techno-Feudalism could be approached through Byung-Chul Han’s lens, prompting me to write a related paper. I found they significantly influence each other; although Han doesn’t explicitly mention “Techno-Feudalism,” his description of the economic system overlaps with Varoufakis’s. Han views this as a form of neoliberalism, a regime emphasizing voluntary self-exploitation. Essentially, he argues that contemporary governance is fundamentally psychopolitical. To clarify, psychopolitics draws from biopolitics and can be seen as its modern evolution. In traditional feudal systems, biopolitics was present, and it persisted until the advent of Techno-Feudalism within capitalism. Although I use the past tense, this dynamic still exists today. However, today there is an additional element: psychopolitics. In fact, while there was coercion over the body in the past, today it extends to the soul, directly to human reactions, thoughts, and feelings. And today, these can be directed through algorithms. Tendencies are being decided by algorithms.

While biopolitics focuses on biological aspects, psychopolitics addresses the soul and mental processes. Its main purpose is to optimize mental and emotional functioning, unlike biopolitics, which aims to overcome bodily resistance for efficiency. When we join the system, we often do so voluntarily, exposing ourselves to self-exploitation. In classical capitalism, participation was not always voluntary, but today, we engage in these platforms willingly, leading to a natural shift in power dynamics. Unlike repressive systems, psychopolitical power is subtler, friendlier, and more tolerant, replacing coercion with positivity. Han refers to this as a “positivity society,” where constantly projecting positivity, appearing good, and sharing the best moments are common. Psychopolitics relies on these positive stimuli to encourage voluntary submission through an appealing narrative. Previously, gatherings and communication among people were seen as a threat to capital interests, but today, the core motivation of Techno-Feudalism is to promote instant sharing, interaction, and engagement through comments and likes. Han describes this as a process driven by voluntary, passionate participation.

“To clarify, psychopolitics draws from biopolitics and can be seen as its modern evolution. In traditional feudal systems, biopolitics was present, and it persisted until the advent of Techno-Feudalism within capitalism.”

The focus of exploitation has shifted to the soul itself, with individuals expected to become entrepreneurs of their own lives. They embed themselves into the system as entrepreneurs, all under the false sense of freedom. Inner domination bonds are internalized, leading individuals to fight themselves. Han argues that, unlike the class struggle in traditional capitalism, this internal conflict fosters superficial socialization. As people grow isolated, they fall into an illusion of social connection via virtual environments, experiencing exploitation that affects their very soul, leading to total subjugation. Not only are bodies and labor exploited, but humans also begin to self-exploit, with free will gradually diminishing within this false freedom. This aligns with Varoufakis’s concept of techno-feudalism, enriching the understanding of psychopolitics.

First, internalized domination is discussed. Varoufakis describes a production model that influences participation and user experience through internal mechanisms rather than external coercion. Returning to Han, he adds to this by introducing voluntary subjectification, highlighting that psychopolitics and Techno-Feudalism create a more individual-centered, subjective framework. The production of data and the soul is also involved; in Han’s view, data directly relates to managing emotions and desires, while for Varoufakis, data serves as a key source of new economic rent. These approaches together show that digital capitalism sources, both spiritual experiences and economic value from data. Consequently, data plays a crucial role in this post-neoliberal system.

While Varoufakis claims techno-feudalism exceeds capitalism, Han characterizes this state as neoliberal. However, Han’s focus on performance, data, subjectification, and digital surveillance aligns entirely with techno-feudalism and indicates that psychopolitics defines a post-neoliberal era. The emotional economy becomes prominent here; Han’s concept of the positivity society where individuals constantly perform, produce, and seek approval complements Varoufakis’s notion of the serf as a user driven by emotional needs. The desire for approval and sharing actions serve as mechanisms for generating data and loyalty within the techno-feudal system. Therefore, considering both together offers a complementary framework for understanding the subject’s participation and share in techno-feudalism.

“Varoufakis argues that capitalism is dead, but I believe we are still within capitalism, perhaps in a transformed form. The core issues of critical capitalism theory -such as the forces and relations of production and the relationship between capital and labor-remain unresolved.”

E.B: Lastly, is there anything you would like to say about this book? Does the book provide the conceptual tools enthusiasts need to analyze contemporary social relations? What alternatives could be suggested? Would you recommend the book as a reader?

M.D: I believe this is a must-read book. It’s engaging, accessible, and can alter our view of current social processes. Discussing alternatives is more complex. Of course, there are options, why conduct these studies if there’s no hope? Still, this remains an ongoing journey. For example, Varoufakis argues that capitalism is dead, but I believe we are still within capitalism, perhaps in a transformed form. The core issues of critical capitalism theory -such as the forces and relations of production and the relationship between capital and labor-remain unresolved.

Many share this view. That’s why I see Techno-Feudalism, like neo-liberalism, as not post-capitalist but part of capitalism. There are certainly alternative paths and methods, all part of the struggle. To explore these, we must ask, “Can we establish a more democratic internet, digital space, or economy?” and examine efforts toward that goal. Varoufakis notes that progress has largely been achieved through algorithmically driven free markets in which producers and consumers interact. But if we see these spaces as akin to the markets and agoras of ancient Greece public places where people gather the scope becomes more political and social. All these processes influence each other. Yet, when public discussion is mediated by algorithms, a different reality emerges. Considering these two dynamics together reveals a more troubling picture, as it undermines the ideal of free public discourse. Alternatives do exist and should be explored. However, this book doesn’t offer a convincing solution. Still, I believe it’s essential reading for anyone interested.

E.B: Thank you very much for your honest explanation and for sharing your insights with us. We’re pleased to have had you as our guest.

M.D: You’re welcome.

Byung-Chul Han

Reviewing Yanis Varoufakis: “Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism?” yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

Anthropologist and communication sciences researcher Professor Erkan Saka delves into the concept of techno-feudalism and the shift from a once-decentralized internet to a landscape dominated by a few major tech oligarchs. Exploring the structural transformation of digital platforms, algorithmic hegemony, and our increasing parallelism to “digital serfs,” Saka unpacks how Big Tech corporations control both internet infrastructure and user data without democratic oversight.

Elif Başlantı: Hello, Professor Saka. Welcome. We are very happy to have you here. Can we start by getting to know who you are?

Erkan Saka: Thank you for the warm welcome. First of all, I appreciate the invitation. I am a faculty member at Istanbul Bilgi University in the Department of New Media and Communication. I have been working on new communication technologies for many years. Overall, I am trying to do this within a field that can be considered media anthropology. And here we are today, that’s how we got here.

Mustafa Burak Avcı: We chose the topic for the special issue of the magazine we are publishing as “Techno- Feudalism”. First of all, could you tell us what Techno- Feudalism is and what we should understand when we hear about it?

E.S: I don’t study this literature directly, but roughly speaking, we can say that a number of large technology companies dominate internet usage in a feudal manner. We can’t talk about a complete monopoly, but it can also be called an oligopolistic market. Sometimes the names of seven tech companies are mentioned, sometimes even more. These companies control the infrastructure and content of the internet tools we use daily. Since there isn’t a democratic process involved, a new concept has emerged that particularly references the Middle Ages.

M.B.A: Reflecting on the 90s and 2000s, when people believed in rapid Internet progress and social democratization, thinking wars were over and to raise a quesiton: “How technological advances Given the conservative nature of techno-feudalism, how are technological advances currently able to bring feudalism back? What are we doing wrong?

E.S: It is Highlighted that the medieval concept mainly focuses on property relations. Currently, it’s hard to determine what is progressive or regressive. Surprisingly, there’s been an unexpected development: widespread disappointment across researchers, social scientists, the public, and internet users. Many were initially pessimistic, but a new communication tool still emerged, offering some benefits. It was claimed to ‘bring world peace’ and to aid democratization to varying degrees.

However, these hopes haven’t materialized today. Not only did they fail, but democratization also didn’t fully occur. The internet’s initially decentralized system has shifted toward centralization, dominated by 6-7 major companies, contradicting democratic ideals.

Initially controlled largely by the U.S., the internet’s influence was tied to American foreign policy. Now, large tech corporations feel no need to pursue democratization, as their dominance already gives them significant power. When combined with political influence, this resembles feudal sovereignty, where powerful entities can control content and exclude users at will.

M.B.A: Capitalism continuously creates monopolies and oligopolies, which are not new. History shows technological breakthroughs but today, a new discussion emerges: how did the Magnificent Seven become so wealthy? Why is the mode of production changing, and is capitalism ending? What’s different today?

E.S: Is it truly wrong to look back and evaluate? While there’s a pause before and after the internet era, similar situations likely occurred earlier. America’s golden age post-1950s was marked by technological dominance, with at least one rival, the Soviet Union, leading at times. However, within the Western world, America’s technological supremacy was clear. During that period, the system was more centralized and state-managed, yet certain brands held significant dominance. After the 1980s and 1990s, some brands gained prominence and products from the Far East entered the market. They have entered a new era, but the period preceding it was one of domination. While debates and issues like central-peripheral dynamics were discussed, today’s landscape features technology companies, which are better described as a feudal, fragmented structure rather than a unified dominion. The journey to this point traces back to the information revolution starting in the 1960s, in which industrial production gradually shifted toward information and data as the source of power. Baudrillard, whom you focus on, would likely be astounded by today’s reality if he saw it in the 1980s.

Back then, the media was less overwhelming, but information’s influence was steadily growing, a trend amplified by the internet, leading to a significant leap. Now, major tech giants are fundamentally data-driven; the transformation of information into data has become the core of power. This development partly stemmed from a lack of regulation without intervention; each company monopolized its domain. While varying in other countries, within the American system, this environment fostered such growth, with regulation only briefly considered during Democratic administrations before shifts in power. Ultimately, placing data at the center means that companies harnessing data now shape this new global order.

“The internet’s initially decentralized system has shifted toward centralization, dominated by 6-7 major companies, contradicting democratic ideals. Initially they were controlled largely by the U.S.”

M.B.A: We’ve observed similar patterns with Bitcoin and virtual currencies. When unknown enters the state realm, regulation follows. Yet, states seem to retreat regarding companies involved in techno-feudalism discussions, especially as Elon Musk consolidates power and possible sanctions are rolled back against Jeff Bezos. Could this signal a shift in the relationship between state and capital, moving away from states regulating and profiting from capital? How do you interpret this shift?

E.S: I believe it’s premature to draw such a conclusion because we still don’t fully grasp these relationships. What we do know is that the Silicon Valley myth was largely created by the American government. There’s no simple story of Stanford University was founded, leading to incredible startups, and then Silicon Valley was born. “When the U.S. fell behind the Soviet Union technologically, it responded with signifi cant investments that laid the foundation for these ventures.” The idea that “Libertarian rhetoric dominates Silicon Valley” is actually misleading, either self-deception or a false impression. Libertarians claim, “We don’t want government involvement,” yet many large companies, including Elon Musk’s, could not have amassed such power without government contracts. Therefore, the dynamics of reliance between these entities are complex. It’s not entirely accurate to say that Big Tech directly controls the U.S. government, as there are mutual interests involved. Snowden’s disclosures also demonstrated that these social media platforms provided extensive intelligence and shared data with the U.S. government. TikTok was the fi rst to challenge the American monopoly; when it achieved great success in the U.S., attempts were made to block or restrict it.

“They could scarcely escape, as they were largely regarded as the property of their feudal lord with no alternative way of life. Today, however, there are different options available to us. The situation isn’t as strict now, but most users can’t fully disconnect from the digital world.”

M.B.A: I think the closing events are still on the agenda.

E.S: Yes, I believe the ownership structure has also shifted. In U.S.A, interference in the algorithm implies a change in the entire American foreign policy. When issues arise, they claim, “Then we will intervene.” This situation has made their mutual relationship more apparent. It’s important to highlight that this is not a one-sided scenario. The U.S. government also gains significantly from these companies. When they previously advocated for internet freedom as a foreign policy issue, it was actually a form of PR aimed at countries targeted by the American government. Looking back now, this is much clearer. Additionally, it’s worth noting that last year, Big Tech was the group that lobbied the most in Washington and spent the most on lobbying. Now, these tech companies are investing even more money there than traditional capital. As I mentioned, there is a mutual relationship between them.

E.B: Since the last U.S. election, discussions on algorithmic hegemony have grown. If a Techno-Feudal system becomes fully integrated, will algorithms cause social change by limiting freedom and choices?

E.S: If the current course remains unchanged, the worst-case scenario depicted here may come true. Fortunately, people are inherently creative and always find ways to resist.

Things rarely unfold exactly as planned because, if they did, we might live in a world where our freedom is stripped away, and algorithms dominate decision-making. In fact, we already live in part in that world, where algorithmic systems influence our daily lives, yet many vulnerabilities remain. These vulnerabilities give us some room to maneuver.

If Big Tech or Elon Musk controlled everything, they would eagerly create a dystopian future, but cracks inevitably appear. History shows that leaving Big Tech unchecked often results in harmful outcomes, although most companies are not inherently malicious. They simply view the world from their own perspective. Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, for example, are focused on their own interests and rarely care about democratization worldwide. The era of Google’s “Don’t be evil” slogan is over. Without such ethical concerns, they feel no obligation to consider individual users. Consequently, it falls on us to protect ourselves.

Additionally, Big Tech’s insensitivity and ineptitude regarding social issues highlight the need for interventions at every level off civil society, initiatives, and governments. Without these efforts, as you mentioned, a dystopian future could emerge, eroding human freedom.

M.B.A: The narrative is harsh, suggesting, “You will techno-feudalize and become serfs.” Could today’s dystopia be self-created? Using social media, liking, and effort might also reinforce algorithmic hegemony.

E.S: I’m uncertain if it’s worth delving too deeply into conspiracy theories. Should we really be pulled further into such worlds? However, sometimes inducing fear can be effective in reaching those who are afraid. It’s unclear whether this is intentional or accidental. For instance, constant criticism of a group can cause people to fear them, and this fear might even lead to that group’s rise to power. I have examples in mind, but I won’t specify them. A similar pattern could exist here, but based on observations, most criticisms seem well-meaning; they aim to prevent the dystopia we’re discussing. Nonetheless, how we critique these issues matters; overly harsh portrayals might be unhelpful. Gramsci’s theories may shed more light on how hegemony is produced, especially since social media doesn’t enter our lives through bullying. It spreads quickly because it’s useful or appears so to us. Despite warnings about data privacy, people continue to use it. This is also worth considering.

E.B: Professor, based on your explanation, I see that consumers have little say and are controlled. Technofeudalism mimics feudalism through digital serfdom. What does digital serfdom mean, and how are we becoming serfs again?

E.S: The techno-feudal analogy is accurate, but I prefer not to be too harsh on the serfdom aspect. We haven’t fully become serfs yet, but the current trend suggests we are heading that way. Historically, serfs were basically the laborers of feudal lords, more like semi-slaves, since most of the land belonged to these lords. Today, a similar situation persists: the platforms we use are not truly ours, and even the content we consume may not legally belong to us. This creates a confusing scenario. Everything you produce is controlled by the platform; if it shuts down or claims to have lost your data, you have little recourse.

This bears a serious resemblance to feudalism. The key difference is that you can now leave the platform, unlike medieval serfs, who had no such option. They could scarcely escape, as they were largely regarded as the property of their feudal lord with no alternative way of life. Today, however, there are different options available to us. The situation isn’t as strict now, but most users can’t fully disconnect from the digital world. Only the elite seems capable of complete detachment from the system. If you leave most platforms, you might not lose much, which is a positive aspect. In the feudal period, survival depended on producing agricultural goods, but today, you can stay afloat even without posting photos. You just miss out on knowing what friends are doing. These platforms help us stay socially connected, but there’s no life-or-death stakes involved. Communication can continue through WhatsApp groups. While platforms haven’t completely boxed us in, it’s still difficult to break those bonds. Sometimes, switching to alternative platforms provides a welcome change. Moving your activity elsewhere is like choosing a different feudal lord, a chance that didn’t exist before and wasn’t easy to find.

M.B.A: The discussion now includes the potential takeover of internet infrastructure technology. For instance, people might say, “I’ll order from Yemeksepeti” without knowing the restaurant. Similarly, taxi stands are replaced by apps, closing traditional stands. It seems we are increasingly creating our own consent for actions.

E.S: You’re right, but as I mentioned, we’re facing a very challenging period. While contemplating how to escape this cycle of Tech-Feudalism, it’s helpful to consider broader perspectives. For instance, why do I use Uber now? I turn to Uber because taxi stands aren’t closing, yet they aren’t functioning properly, and we understand why. There are also local social issues at play. These problems are often exploited by Big Tech feudal lords they sometimes create problems deliberately and then offer solutions, or they simply build their systems atop existing issues. For example, what if children weren’t so captivated by tablets? During my childhood, I could play outside freely. The city provided space for all of us. Today, urbanization has pushed us into digital spaces. To foster real change, social policies that extend beyond the digital sphere are necessary, requiring efforts that go beyond individual action. For example, many local governments worldwide have imposed restrictions on Airbnb. The resulting issues, like increased rent and housing shortages, serve as useful indicators. I believe these local or governmental restrictions offer meaningful signals about how to intervene effectively in the system.

“If you leave most platforms, you might not lose much, which is a positive aspect. In the feudal period, survival depended on producing agricultural goods, but today, you can stay afloat even without posting photos. You just miss out on knowing what friends are doing.”

Umut Yiğit: Professor, in a previous interview with Nurdoğan Rigel, she said, “Social media platforms are invading our private space. This space is becoming both public and private.” From an anthropological and sociological view, how do you describe this transformation? Is private space becoming public? Is the nature of publicness changing, or is our daily public life transforming?

E.S: Let me respond as a true liberal: everything occurs simultaneously. We need a new conceptual framework. While the idea of the public sphere was initially evolving in this direction, the advent of algorithms made organic dissemination of content impossible. Platform-based advertising and business models also enforce this. Most platforms operate this way. Organic content is rarely shared; users must actively oppose the algorithm.

As a result, the originally freer concept of the public sphere has greatly diminished, especially due to Twitter and similar apps. Initially, Twitter was seen as a kind of public space, but over time, we began to reflect more of our private lives. New platforms and initiatives have emerged in this context. Platforms do not explicitly instruct users, but users adapt to the division of roles. Twitter (X) has a distinct structure, while Instagram is assigned a different role. TikTok used to show less of insider views. This necessitates case-by-case analysis and reconsideration of what constitutes publicness. Overall, both the public and private spheres have undergone significant transformation.

Some personal data that we previously regarded as private now appears less so. Clearly, we must reexamine ethical issues using empirical evidence. Since the situation differs across platforms, we cannot directly apply public-space debates to this context. This understanding has become evident.

U.Y: I think a new conceptual framework is needed for the answer.

E.S: Yes, definitely.

Deniz Benzer: We discussed macro-level and structural elements. Based on your anthropology background, what is the micro-level equivalent of these events? What is the relationship between structure and microscale? Does an individual have a unique tactical space, and does it narrow or expand over time?

E.S: Overall, I believe this area has become more limited. Theories by thinkers like Michel de Certeau are relevant here. While some resistance remains, it’s now much harder due to the shift of control to algorithms after the bypassing of the chronological flow. Our ability to challenge the system has thus decreased.

However, people still find ways to bypass censorship or content restrictions imposed by Big Tech through various formats, sometimes even migrating collectively. Although these collective efforts aren’t always successful, we still have the power to decide as a community, for instance, choosing to switch from WhatsApp to Signal. Individual actions rarely achieve results, but once a critical mass is reached, we can compel the system to change certain digital habits.

Recent attempts, like migrating from Twitter to Bluesky or Mastodon, have largely failed, with many returning to X. I personally returned because of the Gulf War situation, but generally, we seek sensation, spreading rumors rather than clear information. We accept chaos in exchange for constant flow. For example, the rise and fall of BeReal show our reluctance to show our natural selves; we prefer filters and poses.

We must ask ourselves the purpose behind our actions. I think we should gather on Mastodon instead of X, but participation remains low. Mastodon has functioned as an alternative for eight years, successful in ways other options haven’t been. Still, we need to understand why we’re not more involved. If we act collectively, we could send a strong message to tech giants. It’s important to view this from multiple angles, acknowledging individual self-criticism but also recognizing that some issues require broader structural regulation.

U.Y: Initially, Instagram only shared posts. As posts became more aesthetic, the “story” format was introduced. Recently, a new feature called Instant was launched, going live immediately after a photo is taken. The system constantly produces new versions to keep content creation lively amid continuous staging. From an anthropological view, how is value formed here?

Erving Goffman

E.S: Erving Goffman described this as the theatrical nature of everyday life years ago. We have always been wearing masks in our daily interactions, even before the internet. Depending on our relationships, we take on different roles, for example, with parents, students, children, or lovers. There’s always an effort to perform and present ourselves attractively. Being authentic can sometimes feel like a bold statement, but in reality, there’s no true ‘natural’ state. We shape ourselves based on the situation at any given moment. Sometimes we aim for internal consistency; other times, we can’t. So, what we see on Instagram isn’t unusual to me; it’s just our way of presenting ourselves publicly.

In this respect, Instagram exemplifies capitalism, constantly generating new commodities with the latest being the “Instant” tool. Certainly, given its vast platform, it can easily incorporate features it finds appealing from other platforms. Currently, people consume content that gives rise to new media types or metas. When users engage with these, Instagram also updates their profiles accordingly. However, humans have diverse perspectives on life. Sometimes, we want to appear natural; other times, we craft a more fictional persona. The reasons behind this variability are complex. As a media theorist, I prefer not to delve into ontological or philosophical debates. From my observations, we tend to mirror the media itself. While media can enhance certain traits we already possess, most behaviors still feel very human. There has also been discussion about “influencers”, who now often seem very artificial. It appears Instagram aims for a more natural look, despite our ongoing posing. Still, “Instant” will also be aestheticized and experimental new meta… That’s the nature of this game.

Sedat Erol: Professor, a study shows that only 20% of the social media content are the ones we ourselves choose, while 80% are ads and promoted posts created by algorithms. We think we’re following our choices, but that’s not true. If we see this feed illusion as Tech- Feudalism, how would you interpret it?

E.S: Currently, I haven’t identified a single concept to fully describe this situation. If I had, I might be famous already. Let’s consider a hypothetical scenario: Tech-Feudalism might not have developed this way; it might have followed a different path. Initially, it was quite different, with a higher chance for organic content and your own content to be noticed and spread. Over time, they devised a new business model, reducing organic growth to the levels you mentioned. Although they could have adopted another revenue stream, they effectively integrated advertising, thereby generating significant profits. Usually, when a system is thriving, people don’t question it or seek improvements for users. It continues until it fails. Currently, with no better options available, we look to Instagram and Twitter. But we know most content isn’t from the accounts we follow. TikTok, on the other hand, has been more successful with personalized content, which explains its rapid rise. Although Meta and Google know us well, they didn’t see the need for personalized content until now. Personally, I find TikTok highly effective because everything aligns with my interests. Other platforms could do the same, but their different business models prevent them from doing so. TikTok is changing now, with more ads appearing, and the content flow may shift. Platforms constantly experiment, and without strong alternatives, they manipulate us, sometimes forcing behaviors.

On YouTube, for instance, to get views, you must run ads; otherwise, watching is nearly impossible. Organic growth takes years to develop. It wasn’t always like this; it evolved over the past 4-5 years. In a few years, platforms may adopt new models that could improve content fl ow. A large user uprising could encourage a shift in system design. For example, AI tools are entirely subscription-based, with paid options pushed immediately. Social networks might evolve in different directions later, but for now, their current operation suits their business interests. We’re compelled to accept this reality.

E.B: Is it possible that what you’re describing could serve as a solution for creating a decentralized internet?

Erkan Saka: Achieving this might be partially possible. Since it hasn’t been attempted yet, the exact risks are unknown. For now, we should monitor how decentralized networks develop and function. I’m cautious because, when blockchain first appeared, it was seen as a nearly unbreakable tool against media censorship. While the immutability of content can be beneficial, it also raises concerns about disinformation. If false information is stored there, it’s impossible to modify or halt its dissemination. Once identified, such issues challenge the idea that blockchain didn’t work either, as it may cause unintended consequences. Currently, decentralization is widely regarded as necessary due to Big Tech’s overwhelming power. Nonetheless, this raises the question: “How can governance be maintained in decentralized systems?’’ We also need to consider this. Currently, social media content is quite poor, and decentralized networks do not guarantee democratization. So, what’s our next step? It’s important to reflect on these questions, but we should still explore these alternatives. The issue is that users today face a few challenges. For instance, techno-feudal lords offers such engaging content that we rarely feel the need to experiment. However, when we do try, we will better understand its potential.

“Currently, decentralization is widely regarded as necessary due to Big Tech’s overwhelming power. Nonetheless, this raises the question: ‘How can governance be maintained in decentralized systems?”’

M.B.A: Today, debates on techno-feudalism divide, with some saying, “This too shall pass,” and others claiming it’s just platform capitalism, not true techno-feudalism. As a media theorist and sociologist, where do you stand on this issue?

E.S: I don’t believe our situation is as dystopian as it might seem. The concept of platform capitalism, I see, doesn’t suggest greater freedom or equal competition. We’re not equally involved in it. Our ability to influence capitalist dynamics is limited. At first, large monopolies regulate and oversee the system. That’s why we’re still in a transitional phase. For example, the impact of artificial intelligence remains uncertain; its transformative potential could shake up the current order. Google, which primarily earns through search, might not fall overnight but could gradually lose importance if it fails to develop new revenue streams. Its dominance as a search engine might diminish. Compared to old feudal lords, tech-oligarchs also operate within quite fragile structures.

“During Trump’s first election, a company called Cambridge Analytica utilized Facebook data to support his campaign. While I don’t believe they alone secured his victory, especially since the Democrats were quite weak, they played a role in micro-targeting voters in what are known as ‘swing states.’ These were states with close votes between Democrats and Republicans, where campaigns tailored their slogans and messages to influence voters.”

E.B: Professor, you mentioned search engine mechanisms. Our data is stored digitally, and our behaviors are commodified. Do these practices deepen surveillance capitalism? How does this exchange ecosystem shape individual political and ideological consent?

E.S: Data analysis and the use of personal data are highly advanced today. Humans are complex; at sub-human or super-human levels, vast amounts of data about us are collected and can be directed. This is already utilized in the commercial sector to stimulate consumption. The internet ordering systems and digital transformation are particularly advanced. My hope is that humans are not entirely stable; we change frequently, and so these mathematical models work to some degree. However, human behavior patterns start to evolve, requiring ongoing analysis. This creates a continuous data chase. Nonetheless, existing data remains valuable. For example, the Cambridge Analytica case, though not very effective overall, appears to have influenced voter behavior during critical moments.

M.B.A: Could you explain a bit more about Cambridge Analytica?

E.S: During Trump’s first election, a company called Cambridge Analytica utilized Facebook data to support his campaign. While I don’t believe they alone secured his victory, especially since the Democrats were quite weak, they played a role in micro-targeting voters in what are known as “swing states.” These were states with close votes between Democrats and Republicans, where campaigns tailored their slogans and messages to influence voters. At that time, Trump nearly won all of these swing states, and the Democrats could have won, too. This illustrates how subtle factors can influence human behavior and lead to specific outcomes. Today’s data is valuable for this purpose, giving those in power influential tools. However, it’s not always effective because people don’t always follow consistent patterns. If they did, sociology and anthropology wouldn’t be needed. Humans can act unexpectedly, which offers hope, but we also follow observable behaviors. That makes data crucial and widely use of data may can shape many of our consumption habits, though we do have some room to escape. In politics, this is even more evident. For instance, when I buy something for personal use, I tend to follow straightforward recommendations. But in political decisions, I don’t always do that, leaving some space for autonomy.

Murat Uluk: When Mansur Yavaş was first elected, he created an alternative to Yemeksepeti, saying, “Restaurants can find a place here, with no commission.” Can municipalities develop apps to break major app monopolies and store data locally?

E.S: The concept of “commons” shared resources relates more to collective situations. For instance, platforms like Facebook could be nationalized gradually. If Mark Zuckerberg finds they aren’t profitable, he might give up, allowing these platforms to become foundations. Many internet services follow this model; Wikipedia is a prime example. It’s the largest data repository, run by a foundation, which could attract advertising but chooses to rely on donations. The internet’s core pillars include organizations like Archive.org and foundation-based models. Although not yet applied directly to social media, these models could be adapted. Such projects are costly and require involvement from local governments or civil initiatives.

Crucially, we should apply lessons learned about the purpose of this service and how its algorithm should reflect that. Transparency in algorithms is vital, especially for public work, as it enables collective input. If an algorithm produces negative outcomes, citizens can support improvements. This approach has proven effective in various cases, though some initiatives, like the Ankara application, didn’t continue. Successful implementation requires good logistics. I believe much of this will become a public activity again. For example, municipal Wi-Fi services were once a form of public service, were later restricted, and could be reintroduced. Governments are increasingly concerned with digital and data sovereignty, leading to more user-supported public efforts. While China and Russia have established their own systems, with genuine goodwill and focus on the user, such models can succeed. Nothing is impossible.

M.U: Professor, considering your experience with FriendFeed and MySpace, how did the ideas you had back then shape your expectations for today?

E.S: There was definitely more hope. Now, I view the internet’s state more critically. In fact, internet users themselves can be problematic. FriendFeed could have thrived independently; those who didn’t maintain it are actually us. There’s a Turkish site where many content pieces are uploaded. I believe this site could have become as popular as Reddit globally. However, the owners acted so greedily and disregarded the users that they initially made good money, but then ruined the platform. I think that site is no longer viable and will gradually fade away. They declared, “Sovereignty must be entirely ours, and there shouldn’t even be moderators. Let’s make money first, then consider other things.” Their greed caused them to lose their standing as a trusted source. I observe similar patterns in the independent media environments I engage with. Friends who receive funding quickly leave us. We actually have talented people, supportive environments, and user potential. Most of the time, we lose because we’re too opportunistic. When faced with this, the Techno-Feudals approach us and

S.E: Professor, about 4-5 months ago, you appeared as a guest on a podcast where your insights on artificial intelligence and academia truly stood out to me. I would like to hear your overall thoughts on how artificial intelligence relates to education.

E.S: It’s been approximately 5-6 years since the emergence of productive artificial intelligence. In my view, this represents the most notable technological shift since the rise of the internet. Although social media, the metaverse, and mobility haven’t directly influenced our curriculum, artificial intelligence has. This creates a serious challenge. For the first time, we need to ask questions like, “How will we handle exams or homework?” Previously, we might have said, “They just copy from Wikipedia,” which was a minor concern. Now, even plagiarism detection tools like Turnitin are ineffective. This technology also directly challenges teachers. We need to reconsider how we deliver education. While students go through their own learning processes, the academic landscape is more impacted because peers work is now easier to access. There’s also an epistemic issue at play. How do we acquire knowledge today? Previously, we complained that “People aren’t reading,” yet some reading still occurred. Now, many rely on a single platform: asking an A.I., which often provides an answer accepted as the final truth. Historically, we would consult Wikipedia or other sources and synthesize information. This over-reliance on A.I. answers raises a serious epistemic crisis, as convenience grows and people stop verifying sources, accepting single answers as truth. This erodes the multi-step process of gathering information, which was educational in itself, prompting questions like “Where should I look?” and “What should I do?” The future is uncertain, but it’s said to engender mental laziness. While this may be partly true, users know that A.I. responses aren’t always sufficient. We adapt by rephrasing prompts to better achieve our goals. I don’t want to present a wholly negative view; even with A.I., we understand that the results are not always adequate on their own, leading us to refine our questions for better answers.

We are still activating our minds, but we’re at a different stage now. It seems we’ve entered a period of transformation. From an academic standpoint, producing writing is now very easy, which can be problematic. Those who criticize this don’t fully understand how the academic process works. Most academics can usually tell if a text was produced by A.I. because academic writing involves a process. Ultimately, more content is being generated. The key question then becomes, “How will your work stand out in this growing pool?” When conducting a literature review with tools like Google, an algorithm runs in the background. Based on your search criteria, your work is either highlighted or overlooked. For instance, I asked A.I. tools such as Elicit, Consensus, and Google Academic Labs, which focus on my main research area, to find my publications. One tool showed my work, while the others did not, and we don’t know how they select results. The question now is, “Whose publications are highlighted?” Could this introduce a new form of data colonialism? We’re still early in these debates. Additionally, there’s concern about what data A.I. is trained on and what information it processes. I’m indirectly involved in a TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye) project to develop a Turkish Large Language Model (LLM). I’m monitoring how local knowledge is incorporated, as existing global models have limited Turkish data. How will Türkiye’s data be integrated into these models? Countries are developing their own language models, but the quality and content inclusion during construction are crucial.

Academic input could be valuable here, though the process remains complex. There’s also a sectoral aspect: industry believes that sector-specific texts will boost personalized learning, a view I share. It’s beneficial if students want to learn a language or other skills, that’s very positive. We used to struggle with this, often unable to solve certain problems. Perhaps A.I. can clarify these matters for us more effectively. However, questions remain about how it will explain and to whom. This is another concern. I believe we are going through the greatest test since the internet’s arrival. That’s my perspective.

M.B.A: Is it necessary to create initiatives against AI, Techno-Feudalism, and digital companies, individually or collectively? Should we, like Luddites, reject AI altogether? How should we position ourselves within this process? Or should we accept our fate and wait for universal income? What are your thoughts?

Erkan Saka: Earning that income is challenging for us, which is why waiting isn’t an option. Although it would be ideal to wait and enjoy a comfortable retirement, we need to actively support all initiatives and open-source projects within our capacity. Standing behind everyone and making an effort is important. We should also contribute to Wikipedia, which is very strict against A.I. generated content. They employ A.I. bots for editing, but all content is verified by human editors and moderators, which is impressive.

Currently, Wikipedia and its sister projects represent some of the most human-produced content, making them important examples in opposition to AI-generated material. Supporting these efforts is crucial. As a community, we can’t stay disconnected; only a small minority can completely avoid digital life, which most of us depend on to sustain ourselves. Resistance from within is possible, such as reviewing our consumption patterns to reduce intake. Some issues, such as the sector’s concept of “multitasking,” are macro-level and beyond individual control. We need to understand what true “multitasking” actually involves and when it’s appropriate. I love “multitasking” and I believe that I do it very well. However, many people just open multiple screens, thinking it’s effective. It’s important to deconstruct concepts like productivity and ask what real efficiency and results truly mean. We should reassess these ideas for ourselves. I believe in these concepts and strive to improve my efficiency, but beyond sector-imposed language and advertising, we need to find what’s beneficial for us and our environment. This requires internal effort, and sharing ideas and experiences collectively is vital.

“Through mutual learning, we can work more efficiently and live healthier lives. Certainly, beyond this, regulations must be enacted by top-level executives, as that’s the only way to effectively combat these issues. Civil initiatives are definitely valuable.”

With over ten new A.I. tools emerging daily, sharing our insights helps us avoid wasting time. Through mutual learning, we can work more efficiently and live healthier lives. Certainly, beyond this, regulations must be enacted by top-level executives, as that’s the only way to effectively combat these issues. Civil initiatives are defi nitely valuable.

I have a story related to this about 15 years ago, I was walking in Berlin after an event when I saw a group of 15-20 people protesting against Big Tech’s use of our personal data. I initially thought, “What impact can this small group have?” and felt a bit sad. Now, however, the European Union is known for its strict personal data regulations, controlling a vast market with significant influence. The system they’ve put in place is effective, maybe not perfect, but it exists. Reflecting on this, I realize those small efforts and initiatives led to meaningful outcomes. I still believe that a sphere of influence can be established. Today, X is sometimes used to seek justice, showing that these platforms aren’t empty spaces. Still, our work to establish reliable sources must continue, including creating digital archives and mastering control over information and data. That’s why I focus on my website for my main content. While I share on social media to increase interaction, it’s not my primary communication channel. Engagement often offers no real benefits and can even work against us. Sometimes, it’s better to remain unseen.

M.B.A: Thank you very much for participating then.

Erkan Saka: Thank you very much. I am honored.

The Illusion of Daily Life: “The Era of ‘Don’t Be Evil’ is Over” yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.

“Capitalism is inherently rooted in human nature,” forming the basis of the classical school of economics. This view posits that capitalism is distinguished by its focus on rational profit maximization, based on the belief that humans are intelligent beings who consider potential gains in all actions.

Recently, questions such as “Where is humanity headed?” and “Is capitalism ending?” are being addressed through a new framework called Techno-Feudalism or Neo-Feudalism. As technological progress, including AI, robotics, and internet infrastructure, becomes deeply integrated into daily life, discussions of universal basic income are often paired with dystopian visions from Big Tech. Even critical studies supporting this framework suggest capitalism’s demise. Nonetheless, many other works focus on capitalism’s emergence, growth, and crises. Certainly, before dismantling capitalism, it is essential to ask, “How did capitalism originate?” This question offers crucial insight into the story of capitalism’s demise. Nevertheless, answering it is challenging. Even after centuries, there is no consensus in social and economic sciences, and it remains a focus of significant research.

While various answers exist, two main perspectives are often introduced. The first argues that “Capitalism is inherently rooted in human nature” forming the basis of the classical school of economics. This view posits that capitalism is distinguished by its focus on rational profit maximization (RCT Theory), based on the belief that humans are intelligent beings who consider potential gains in all actions. It also suggests that capitalism, by seeking to enhance labor productivity through technological means, assumes that humans will naturally choose the most efficient methods, which it regards as an instinct. These ideas are grounded in Enlightenment notions of progress, which view humanity’s ongoing enlightenment as culminating in humans’ realization of their true nature. Until then, humans have faced significant challenges, with the development of capitalism seen as a process of overcoming these obstacles. Evidence for this perspective includes technological advances since Homo sapiens first used tools and historical exchange of material commodities.

This perspective suggests that capitalism has no point of origin. While human nature continues to exist, it must transcend its constraints -such as those from Feudalism- to mature. These constraints are often political: feudal lords, parasitic powers, culture, and religion. Regulations that hinder human nature constrain the growth of “economic” agents. So, even after humanity’s goal of globalization and the transformation of economic agents into regulators, why do traces of feudalism re-emerge under the guise of Techno-Feudalism?

A second perspective emerges from a critical view on capitalism, rooted in Marx’s foundational work, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859). Marx’s critique highlighted that wealth is not inherently capital; rather, capital represents a specific social relation. This suggests that wealth accumulation alone did not directly lead to capitalism’s rise, as capital is more than just wealth or profit; it is a form of social relationship. Consequently, capitalism’s origins are not solely tied to accumulation. In contrast to other theories, this view implies that humans are not inherently driven by profit maximization or productivity.

Capitalism and its social relations drove humans to seek maximum profit. It was not human nature that turned wealth into capital, but social property transformations that created the laws of capitalist movement unprecedented in history. In a changing world, competition, profit maximization, and the re-creation of surplus value necessitated constant workforce growth and development. This law of movement was unique to this era. Hence, capitalism was both a historical beginning and a finite process, neither inevitable nor the end of history. Techno-feudalism might have risen from capitalism’s ashes, altering social property relations and redefining humans as social beings. Ultimately, capitalism, like feudalism, could lose its specific laws. So, how did feudalism dissolve? Ellen Meiksins Wood, an American political theorist and historian, explains that feudalism was a specific mode of production where the economy and political authority were closely linked. Unlike capitalism, this system relied on non-economic coercive methods to extract surplus value. Peasants, often near castles for safety and market access, had direct access to land, allowing them to acquire surplus agricultural and craft products through military force. As states expanded, cities grew, and transportation improved, societal control increased. Over time, political pressure on serfdom decreased, with military power centralizing in absolutist states or large kingdoms and empires. For instance, English landowners moved from forcibly extracting surplus to renting land within competitive markets. Enclosures displaced peasants, ending subsistence farming and forcing them into a working-class role where they had to sell their labor to survive.

Illustration depicting the Enclosure Movement and the displacement of peasants from common lands, marking the transition to capitalism.

Now, exploitation shifted from the lord’s sword to the cold, invisible mechanisms of the market. The division between the economic and political spheres brought about changes in social relations. Dispossessed peasants developed a rational market-based economy to survive. Capitalism, emerging within its unique historical context, quickly expanded into a global economy.

“For instance, English landowners moved from forcibly extracting surplus to renting land within competitive markets. Enclosures displaced peasants, ending subsistence farming and forcing them into a workingclass role where they had to sell their labor to survive.”

Immanuel Wallerstein, an American sociologist renowned for his work in historical sociology and developing world-systems theory, argued that feudalism would end just as it had arisen. He theorized that every system is born, runs its natural cycle, and eventually, because of structural contradictions, enters a permanent crisis phase. The modern world-system, which emerged from the crisis of feudalism, is based on a vast network characterized by unequal exchange between the core and peripheral nations. While earlier capitalism overcame stagnation through territorial expansion, it can no longer do so in today’s highly developed global economy, having reached its mathematical limits. Factors such as rising labor costs from declining rural populations, ecological costs from exhausted natural resources, and growing tax burdens on education and healthcare contributed to this stagnation. The crisis became evident as overall profit rates shrank, pushing capitalism toward a breaking point, as Wallerstein noted in The End of the Known World.

The initial response of capital to the prolonged decline in the system’s profit rates was the rise of Neo-liberalism. However, as the bottleneck in production continued, capital shifted toward financial speculation. Instead of expanding through production, capital began to grow through finance. This unsustainable system collapsed during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. To rescue the system, central banks printed trillions of dollars of fiat money. Since there were no profit expectations in finance, this influx directly inflated technology companies’ share prices, enabling significant investment in digital infrastructure.

Economist Yanis Varoufakis describes this phenomenon as the emergence of Techno-Feudalism, which diverges from traditional market mechanisms. He argues that companies funded mainly by unbacked central bank money, which dominate internet platforms, undermine capitalism’s core principles, markets, and profit mechanisms. A new feudal-like parasitic structure has emerged over production, with productive capital now dependent on these platforms.

Historic view of Wall Street illustrating the rise of financial capitalism in 19th-century New York.

Financial capital clusters around them to compete and seek profit or growth. Fiber-optic cables, data centers, and A.I. systems connect the world, making productive capital reliant on these infrastructures.

“Economist Yanis Varoufakis describes this phenomenon as the emergence of Techno-Feudalism, which diverges from traditional market mechanisms. He argues that companies funded mainly by unbacked central bank money, which dominate internet platforms, undermine capitalism’s core principles, markets, and profit mechanisms. A new feudal-like parasitic structure has emerged over production, with productive capital now dependent on these platforms.”

Major corporations like Amazon, Google, Meta, and Apple now control this landscape. Platforms and algorithms dominate consumer markets, dictating choices and prices with near-absolute authority. Consequently, productive investments are reduced to rent-seeking activities, such as feudalism, in which peasants paid a share of their harvest to landowners. Today, producers and programmers often pay 30-40% of their sales as rent to platform owners. Billions of people work as digital serfs to grow cloud capital entirely voluntarily, thinking they are just having fun or socializing without any charge. Every search, share, and like trains these algorithms and provides data about consumer habits. Moreover, this cloud capital uses this data to hold our attention hostage, exploit dopamine cycles, and directly implant desires into minds, trapping them in an algorithmic hegemony. Jodi Dean, an American political scientist, notes that the once-dissolving divide between the economic and political realms of capitalism is now reversing, with the economy gaining political influence.

“Digital network owners are controlling trade, influencing free expression, and even affecting daily life, much like sovereign states. As this shift towards a Great Tech Authoritarianism unfolds, all intelligence and health data are increasingly managed by cloud capital.”

Originally seen as a democratic space, the internet now has the power to heavily influence preferences through algorithms that shape the content which users interact. Digital network owners are controlling trade, influencing free expression, and even affecting daily life, much like sovereign states. As this shift towards a Great Tech Authoritarianism unfolds, all intelligence and health data are increasingly managed by cloud capital. Today, as Wallerstein suggests, the end of the world as we know it is near. Tech-Feudalism hasn’t yet broken the fundamental laws of capitalism. It’s possible that social relations are already changing in ways we’re not noticing.

Big Tech Authoritarianism

“The initial response of capital to the prolonged decline in the system’s profit rates was the rise of Neo-liberalism. However, as the production bottleneck persisted, capital shifted toward financial speculation. Instead of expanding through production, capital began to grow through finance.”

Some studies claim that Neo-Feudalism is a natural phase of capitalism, and a significant number of people are thinking about the end of capitalism. Perhaps solutions to capitalism’s crises lie with major tech companies. Y. Varoufakis, notable for his work in this area, advocates for cyber boycotts and global strikes by mobilizing the cloud, calling on all humanity to join. He believes resistance efforts should be initiated, and the last chance to act should not be missed. We will see how it unfolds.

Before the Fall: What History of Capitalism Reveals About Techno-Feudalism? yazısı ilk önce Context Dergi üzerinde ortaya çıktı.